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As befits its name, the "classic property clause doctrine" I is a varia-
tion on the ubiquitous Golden Age myth: during some remote age, he-
roes lived among us and the truth was understood. But the truth has
been lost and the scourge we face is punishment for our sin, for failing
to be heroes ourselves. The truth from the Golden Age is the "classic
property clause doctrine," the thesis that the federal government as a
landowner has only limited powers; the sin is slothfulness, the unwilling-
ness "to expend the intellectual effort necessary to comprehend [the]
intricacies" of the truth;2 the scourge is the waning of state authority
over the federal lands as highlighted by the Kleppe decision.
3
The classic theory has assumed two different forms. The first con-
cludes that in managing federal lands Congress lacks the power to pre-
empt state laws because its proper constitutional role is that of a mere
proprietor. As with other landowners, federal interests as a proprietor
* B.A., Columbia College; J.D., University of Oregon. Special thanks to Carol
Bradford, Art Smith, and Charles Wilkinson for reading an earlier draft of this article. The
research for this article was partially funded by a grant from the University of Idaho Re-
search Council.
i. The term was applied by Professor David Engdahl. See Engdahl, State and Federal
Power over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 288 (1976). The basic tenets of the argu-
ment are, however, considerably older. The first detailed statement of the position I have
found is an address of Ninian Edward, Governor of Illinois, to the Illinois General Assem-
bly. See Address by Governor Edwards, Illinois General Assembly (Dec. 2, 1828), reprinted
in HouseJournal, 6th Assembly, 1st Sess. 10-39 (Kaskaskia, 11. 1829).
A historical basis for the position is set out in two articles prompted by the decision in
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), that the federal government had the para-
mount right to sea floor within three miles of shore. Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, The
Constitution and the Continental Shelf, 26 TEX. L. REV. 398 (1948); Patterson, The Relation of the
Federal Government to the Territories and the States in Landholding, 28 TEX. L. REV. 43 (1949); cf.
Clark, National Sovereignty and Dominion over Lands Underlying the Ocean, 27 TEX. L. REv. 140
(1948) (defending the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. California).
More recently, the "Sagebrush Rebellion" prompted a reexamination of the respec-
tive authority of federal and state governments over the public lands. E.g., Brodie, A Ques-
tion of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional Issues Surrounding Federal Ownership of the Public Lands,
12 PAC. L.J. 693 (1981); Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics, and Federal
Lands, 14 U.C.D.L. REV. 317 (1980); Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Foot-
ing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Property Power]; Note,
The Sagebrush Rebellion: Who Should Control the Public Lands?, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505 [herein-
after cited as Note, Sagebrush Rebellion].
Finally, after the initial draft of this article was completed, another article covering
some of the same ground came to hand. See Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property Clause
Theory, 63 N.C.L. REV. 201 (1985).
2. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 384.
3. Id. at 349 (referring to Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976)).
495
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
can be overridden by state law.4 The second and more extreme varia-
tion has most recently been associated with the "Sagebrush Rebellion."
Proponents of this variation assert that Congress lacks the constitutional
authority to hold lands even as a proprietor and, therefore, is required
to transfer title into state or private hands.
5
Despite their dissimilar conclusions, advocates of both variations of
the classic doctrine share a common analysis. Beginning with the prop-
osition that the federal government has only those powers delegated to
it in the Constitution, they note that the Constitution contains two sepa-
rate clauses applicable to real property. The first, in article I, provides
for "exclusive legislation" over land acquired with the consent of the
state in which it is located. 6 The second, in article IV, grants Congress
the power to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property [of] the United States."'7 For proponents of
the classic doctrine, the presence of two clauses is decisive. Because the
article I clause preempts all state laws, the article IV clause must there-
fore lack preemptive effect.8 Advocates of both variations of the classic
doctrine thus share a fundamental proposition: the article IV property
clause is not a grant of power to govern federal land once that land is
4. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 296.
5. See, e.g., Brodie, supra note 1, at 694; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at
408, 416-20; Patterson, supra note 1, at 58-60. Despite the difference in their conclusions,
the classic theorists share a common core of ideas and assumptions, which is the subject of
this article.
6. The article I clause grants Congress the power
to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District . . . as
may . . . become the Seat of the Government . . .and to exercise like authority
over all places purchased by Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the
Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-yards, and
other needful Buildings.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
7. Article IV grants Congress the "Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Although the grant of "exclusive legislation" over
article I property has created few difficulties, the grant of power in article IV has been a
source of conflict. Professor Engdahl argues that this discord results from the fact that the
clause is the source of federal authority over two distinct types of federal property: terri-
tory outside of any state and non-article I property within a state. He argues that this
divergence has produced confusion because - despite their common source in article IV
- the scope of federal power over each type of land is distinctly different. When the
United States acquires title by conquest or purchase to land outside any state, it obtains
both title to and exclusive governmental jurisdiction over the land because there is no other
sovereign within the territory. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 292. Once the territory becomes a
state, however, there is another sovereign and the federal government's powers under
article IV necessarily changes as a result of the equal footing doctrine, which limits federal
power in new states to the power it had in the original thirteen states. Id. at 293-96.
8. Some proponents of the classic doctrine do recognize two situations in which fed-
eral law based on article IV preempted state law during the classical period. Engdahl,
supra note 1, at 296-97, 306-08; Note, Property Power, supra note 1, at 821. These excep-
tions are discussed at infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
In addition, the doctrine's proponents acknowledge that the United States may rely
upon an enumerated power as the basis for statutes preempting state control over federal
property. The classic theorists' thesis is simply that the article IV clause grants no addi-
tional power.
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included within a state. 9 Congressional power over property differs fun-
damentally from its power over commerce,' 0 coinage,' or road con-
struction 12 because the property power ceases with statehood. The
classic doctrine thus resolves into an equal footing argument: because
the federal government had no dominium or imperium over land as land in
the original thirteen states, the presence of either in the new states vio-
lates equal footing.'
3
Given their rejection of the accepted construction of the article IV
clause, classic theorists have a substantial burden. They must demon-
strate not only that their interpretation is permissible, but also that it is
constitutionally mandated; that is, they must prove that the constitu-
tional text is determinate and that their interpretation is the only per-
missible one.
There are a host of arguments that they might employ to meet this
burden. Proponents of the doctrine might, for example, argue that the
clause's language commands their position, that land differs from other
possible objects of federal power, therefore, requiring differing inter-
pretive procedures, or, in the alternative, that the history of the drafting
or subsequent judicial application of the clause makes their interpreta-
tion inescapable.
The proponents of the doctrine unfortunately fail to carry their bur-
den of persuasion. Although attractive, 14 the doctrine is fundamentally
misconceived. First, while imperium and dominium are generally separate
in this country, there is no legal or logical requirement for this separa-
9. Brodie, supra note 1, at 694, 710-11; Engdahl, supra note 1, at 296-300, 384; Hard-
wicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 408; Note, Property Power, supra note 1, at 837.
10. U.S. CONssr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. Id. at cl. 5.
12. Id. at cl. 7.
13. The classic theorists do not state the dichotomy in terms of imperium and dominium,
though this seems their thrust. Engdahl, for example, distinguishes between "governmen-
tal jurisdiction" and the "limited powers of a proprietor." Engdahl, supra note 1, at 296.
See also Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 431-32 (federal government becomes
an imperial government when it holds property for other than "governmental purposes").
"Dominium" is "perfect and complete property or ownership in a thing"; "imperium" is
"the right to command, which includes the right to employ the force of the state to enforce
the laws." I BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 605, 990 (Rawle's ed. 1897). The terms have
acquired the general meaning of "property" and "sovereignty." See United States v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 19, 43-44 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See generally United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 712-13, 719 (1950) (discussing dominium and imperium as, respectively,
"ownership or property rights" and "governmental powers of regulation and control" and
noting that they are commonly, though not necessarily, distinct).
14. Because a state's power over land is essentially a power to prohibit instead of a
power to requires uses, a state could prohibit a federal use, other than one tied to an
"enumerated power," but could not require a specific use. In most cases, the classic doc-
trine would require that land be used in the least intensive of the potentially different
federal and state preferences. As an officially certified "environmental extremist," I find
the possibility of increased environmental constraints attractive. SeeJ. LASH, K. GILLMAN &
D. SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS 235-39 (1984).
At the same time, I have a place in the demonology of the proponents of the classic
doctrine. The initial research for this article was undertaken while I was employed in the
Solicitor's Office at the Department of the Interior, as a lawyer who necessarily advocated
"the immediate interests of the federal government.., in the face of unpersuasive rheto-
ric about states' rights and the tenth amendment." Engdahl, supra note 1, at 284.
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tion; governments can hold land in a governmental capacity as well as in
a proprietary capacity. Second, in this country imperium is divided be-
tween state and federal governments in line with the powers granted to
the federal government by the Constitution, including the provisions of
article IV. Finally, the classic theorists' equal footing argument involves
a confusion of factual equality, which is not guaranteed by the doctrine,
with political equality, which is guaranteed. Both Congress and the
Supreme Court have consistently accorded the property clause an ex-
pansive reading that is consistent with this understanding of the clause
and the history of the public lands in the period preceding the drafting
of the Constitution.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE
Advocates of the classic doctrine begin with the proposition that the
article IV property clause differs from other clauses of the Constitution
because it is not an "enumerated power."' 5 In light of this argument, it
is surprising that classic theorists provide no textual analysis of the
clause.
This absence of analysis may be due to the language of the article
IV clause: "Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Prop-
erty belonging to the United States."' 16 The language is verbally indis-
tinguishable from other grants of power to Congress:' 7 the statements
that "Congress shall have Power . . .To regulate Commerce,' 8 "To
coin Money [and] regulate the Value thereof,"' 9 and "To make Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" 20 are
each accepted by classic theorists as enumerated powers despite their
15. E.g., Note, Property Power, supra note 1, at 826. Although this tenet is implicit in all
proponents of the doctrine, Mr. Brodie in particular emphasizes the point. Brodie, supra
note 1, at 715-23. The principle that the government of the United States is a government
of enumerated powers assumes unusual shapes in his argument. He insists, for example,
that the power to retain lands is not expressly granted and, therefore, is unconstitutional,
while simultaneously asserting that "[t]he ability of the United States to acquire territory
by gift, conquest, purchase, annexation, or bequest is vested in it by the Constitution
.... "Id. at 718. At best, however, the drafters were remarkably indirect in expressly
granting this power. Indeed, the question of the existence of such authority was the sub-
ject of sharply divergent views when the United States purchased Louisiana from France.
J. ADAMS, THE LIVES OF JAMES MADISON AND JAMES MONROE 78-79 (Boston 1850); E.
BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1803-1812, at 14-35
(1920).
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
17. The clause does not say "Congress shall have Power to make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting disposal of the Territory or other Property of the United States" or
"Congress shall not have Power to exercise exclusive Legislation in any case whatsoever."
Instead, the language simply empowers Congress to "dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property [of] the United States."
Id.
18. Id. at art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
19. Id. at cl. 5.
20. Id. at c1. 14.
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obvious verbal similarities to the article IV clause. 2'
Despite the similar language, classic theorists argue that the lan-
guage of article IV is either a grant of authority only to dispose of fed-
eral lands or that it grants no sovereign power to manage federal lands
inconsistently with state law. The article IV clause thus is accorded a
special interpretation. The authority to make "rules" and "regulations"
respecting land differs from the authority granted when the same terms
are applied to money, commerce, or the armed forces. Furthermore,
advocates of the doctrine offer no explanation for the unique constitu-
tional status of "Territory or other Property."
2 2
The mere fact that federal ownership of land potentially limits state
authority is in itself an insufficient basis for differing constitutional re-
sults; each of the powers granted to Congress imposes a corresponding
limitation on state authority. 2 3 The question is not whether the power
21. See, e.g., Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 56
(1973).
22. Mr. Brodie attempts to meet this difficulty by arguing that the location of the
clause "in that area of the founding document that deals with the relative positions of the
state and central governments within the federalist system," instead of in article I, the
"logical" place, demonstrates that "it was felt that the federal government should own no
property for any purpose other than for the implementation of its enumerated functions."
Brodie, supra note 1, at 720-21. This argument is problematic for several reason:
First, the clause does "deal with the relative position of the state and central govern-
ment" by specifying that it is to be the federal government which determines the disposi-
tion of federal lands. Similarly, the list of congressional powers in article I, section 8, the
supremacy clause in article VI, and any number of other provisions also specify the relative
positions of the federal and state governments because any delegation of power to the
federal government necessarily limits state authority over the same subject.
Second, as Professor Engdahl has noted, enumerated powers "are scattered through-
out the body of the Constitution." Engdahl, supra note 21, at 56. See also Hardwicke, Illig
& Patterson, supra note 1, at 417 (noting that enumerated powers are found not only in
article I, section 8, but also in "such other provisions as Article IV, Section 3"). Article III,
for example, grants Congress the power to create inferior federal courts. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1. Similarly, article IV contain grants of power to Congress, most notably the au-
thority to admit new states.
23. Mr. Brodie simply asserts that "the right to control the property within its own
geographical boundaries is implicit in the concept of a 'state' itself. Such power is an
essential component in the concept of sovereignty." Brodie, supra note 1, at 712 (emphasis
added). This argument is unpersuasive.
First, states are less than "pure" sovereigns. As King from Massachusetts noted dur-
ing the debates on the Constitution, much of the discussion of state powers used the term
"Sovereignty ... inaccurately & delusively [because the states] did not possess the pecu-
liar features of sovereignty," such as the ability to make war. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 323 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as vol. CON VE.-ION
RECORDS]. State sovereignty was further limited by the powers granted to the federal gov-
ernment. See License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 588 (1847); Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
DalI.) 419, 469, 429, 453 (1793) (opinions ofJay, C.J., Iredall & Wilson, JJ., respectively);
THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 93 (A. Hamilton) (. Cooke ed. 1961); id. at No. 39 (.
Madison). One such limitation upon the states is the lack of the power to control federal
property located within their borders, a lack recognized during the earliest days of the
Constitution. E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819). Federal
real property is simply another example of this general principle.
Second, searching for "essential" attributes of sovereignty is a "snipe" hunt. See gener-
ally Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1015 (1985)
("Neither the governmental/proprietary distinction nor any other that purports to sepa-
rate out important governmental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a
1986]
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restricts state authority, but whether Congress was granted the power. 24
In the absence of a constitutionally significant distinction between land
and other objects of federal power, there is no apparent reason not to
give the words used in the clause the same effect that they have in other
constitutional clauses, and, therefore, to read the clause as granting the
power to regulate federal real property and the activities occurring on it.
In short, the proponents of the classic doctrine fail to provide a convinc-
ing justification for their conclusion that rules respecting federal lands
are subject to state authority while rules regulating commerce are not.
2 5
In place of an analysis of either the language of the clauses or the
reasons for distinguishing property from other constitutional subjects,
advocates of the classic doctrine rely upon a rhetorical device: the exclu-
sivity theorem - the presumption that the grant of complete preemp-
tive power in one clause precludes the grant of any preemptive power in
another clause.
26
It is important to note the nature of this argument. The presence of
two clauses concerning federal power over land logically supports the
conclusion that they do not grant identical powers because otherwise
there would have been no need for both clauses. Because the grant of
"exclusive legislation" in the article I clause preempts all state law, the
article IV clause logically may not have the same effect. Classic theo-
rists, however, take an additional step by assuming that because article I
completely preempts state law, article IV grants Congress no preemptive
power. This extension lacks any logical basis.
There is no reason why reading article I as a grant of complete pre-
emptive power to the federal government within the territorial confines
of one type of lands compels reading article IV as granting no preemp-
tive power over another class of property. To say that article I and arti-
cle IV are different does not mean that they share nothing in common -
only that they are not identical. 2 7 Acknowledging that article IV does
not grant exclusive federal jurisdiction over all activities occurring on
democratic society."). This is particularly true when the searcher does not set out even a
general description of the beast being sought.
24. E.g., Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 416-18. The authors state that
the tenth amendment was included "[t]o foreclose any argument which might be made for
extending powers to the Federal Government by interpretation..." and argue that "the
prerogative of the Federal Government in regard to land or territory was expressly lim-
ited" by the provisions of the article I and article IV property clauses. Id. at 417. On the
tenth amendment argument, see, for example, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 406-10 (1819). On the proposition that grants of power operate negatively, see gen-
erally infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
25. One potentially significant difference has emerged. The Supreme Court in Kleppe
and the other property clause cases attacked as error by the classic theorists has required
congressional action before finding state laws inapplicable. E.g., Wilkinson, The Field of
Public Land Law: Some Connecting Threads and Future Directions, 1 PuB. LAND L. REV. 1, 7-15
(1980). There does not appear to be a "dormant property clause" akin to the dormant
commerce clause.
26. E.g., Engdahl, supra note i, at 296; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note I, at
418-20.
27. The negation of complete preemptive power is incomplete preemptive power instead of no
preemptive power.
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public lands does not therefore mean that federal authority is limited to
that of a proprietor. It is at least equally logical to read the article I
clause as completely displacing state law by its own force, while the arti-
cle IV clause is preemptive only to the extent that state law is inconsis-
tent with congressional legislation. 28 That is, the article IV clause
merely authorizes Congress to preempt state law. Indeed, because the
Constitution is a document that delegates power to the federal govern-
ment, the latter interpretation logically makes more sense.
Classic theorists do not explicitly state the mutual exclusivity theo-
rem. Instead, they repeatedly contrast federal authority under the two
clauses in terms of a dichotomy between the "governmental jurisdic-
tion" - imperium - that the federal government exercises over article I
lands, and the "limited power" of a proprietor - dominium - that it
possesses over article IV lands.2 9 Much of the analytical confusion in
the classic doctrine as well as much of its persuasive power stems from
the use of this ambiguous dichotomy.30 By iterating the thesis as a con-
trast between proprietary and governmental, advocates of the doctrine
play upon a range of similar pairings and the binary nature of common-
law analysis. 3 1 However, the dichotomy is false; the terms obscure in-
stead of enlighten because they do not address the central question.
In this country imperium is divided between state and federal govern-
ments. That portion of the imperium allocated to the federal government
is specified in the Constitution; the residue is held by the states. The
central question thus is how the Constitution allocates the imperium over
article IV lands. Given the language of article IV, this is a question of
what limitations are imposed upon the grant of power to Congress to
make rules and regulations respecting such lands. The governmental-
proprietary dichotomy is of no assistance in resolving these questions.
Federal authority over article IV lands is limited. Despite the rhetoric of
some advocates, 3 2 the states do exercise a wide range of powers over
28. See Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918) ("The police power of the
State extends over the federal public domain, at least when there is no legislation by Con-
gress on the subject."); THE FEDERALIST, supra note 23, at No. 32 (A. Hamilton).
29. E.g., Engdahl, supra note 1, at 296; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at
431-32 (arguing that the federal government becomes an imperial government when it
holds lands within states for nongovernmental purposes).
30. Cf Wells & Hellerstein, The Govern mental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law,
66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980) (concluding that the dichotomy is employed to accommodate
conflicting interests in two categories of cases: (1) in deciding whether to deny a state an
immunity from suit or from federal taxation and regulation, and (2) in applying federal
constitutional limitations to state activities; in both categories, states acting as "proprie-
tors" enjoy less protection from federal action and are, therefore, likely to be treated as
private individuals). The Supreme Court has expressed dissatisfaction with this dichot-
omy. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
31. Much of the common law proceeds by classifying something as either one thing or
the other thing. For example, governmental actions are either ministerial or discretionary.
Similarly, an individual is liable in negligence if her unreasonable conduct caused injury
but not if her reasonable conduct caused injury. These and other dichotomies are ulti-
mately helpful in resolving the basic legal dichotomy: liable or not liable; guilty or not
guilty.
32. E.g., Brodie, supra note 1, at 711, ("It is pure sophistry to contend that the states
currently have any real ability to govern, implement legislation, or exercise jurisdiction
1986]
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federal lands within their borders. 33 The limits on federal authority,
however, are not captured within the opaque governmental-proprietary
dichotomy. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, the limits
are primarily political instead of judicial.
34
In place of an analysis of the property clause, classic theorists con-
tend that the doctrine has previously been adopted by the Supreme
Court. Therefore, they argue that the doctrine was the law in the
Golden Age.
II. THE CASE LAW: STRAINING JUDICIAL DICTA
Proponents of the classic doctrine base their thesis primarily upon a
handful of nineteenth century United States Supreme Court decisions
that they contend adopted the doctrine.3 5 They argue that the classic
theory is implicit in the rationales of the cases as the unstated major
premise of the decisions.
There are two fundamental difficulties with this argument. First,
the cases upon which the advocates rely did not adopt the doctrine even
as an unstated but necessary premise to the holdings. Rather the classic
theorists' interpretation is a substantial extension of the equal footing
doctrine. Second, the classic theorists have chosen their cases carefully,
ignoring a large number of contemporaneous decisions that are incon-
sistent with their arguments.
A. The Property Clause
The most important case for the classic theorists' is Pollard v. Ha-
gan,3 6 a case involving conflicting titles to a parcel of land. The plain-
tiff's claim was based upon a federal patent, while the defendant's claim
was founded upon a deed from the state. Defendant challenged plain-
tiff's title, contending that the land in question was not federal property
when the patent was issued because the land was below the mean high
water line and thus was state property. The United States Supreme
Court agreed that the land was state property. The Court had previ-
over the public lands within their geographical limits."); Note, Property Power, supra note 1,
at 824 n.56.
33. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (upholding
the constitutionality of a state severance tax on coal mined on federal lands); Omaechevar-
ria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 346 (1918) ("The police power of the State extends over the
federal public domain at least when there is no legislation by Congress on the subject.");
Wilkinson, Cross-Jurisdictional Conflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State Interests on Federal and
Indian Lands, 2 U.C.L.A.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. 145, 153-54 (1982) (noting that state laws
apply unless specifically preempted by federal statutes).
34. E.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540-41 (1976); cf. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 5-11, at 254 (1978) (the property clauses as "an area of congres-
sional authority limited primarily by considerations of federalism").
35. See Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1893); Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114
U.S. 525 (1885); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). These cases are discussed
infra note 44 and accompanying text.
36. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). See Brodie, supra note 1, at 713-14; Engdahl, supra
note 1, at 293-96; Note, Property Power, supra note 1, at 833-37.
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ously decided that the original thirteen states held title to lands beneath
navigable waters within their boundaries as an incident of sovereignty 3 7 and
therefore concluded that upon admission into the Union, Alabama "suc-
ceeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain
[that the original thirteen states possessed] except so far as this right was
diminished by the public lands remaining in the possession and under
the control of the United States .... .38 Thus, Alabama as a state was
entitled to the same degree of sovereignty as the original thirteen states
and, consequently, defendant's title, which was based on state law, was
valid.
Classical theorists base their argument in large part upon dicta in
Pollard that does support a restrictive interpretation of congressional au-
thority over article IV lands. The Court stated that "the United States
have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sover-
eignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a State .... .,,3 Based
largely upon this phrase, the classic theorists interpret the case as estab-
lishing three constitutional propositions: first, that states are empow-
ered to exercise "general governmental authority" over all non-article I
property within their boundaries; second, that the federal government
lacks the power of exclusive legislation within both old and new states
under article IV; and therefore, that the federal government loses any
"governmental authority" over article IV lands upon admission of a
state into the Union.
4 0
Although the first two propositions are supported by logic as well as
dicta, 4 ' the advocates' conclusion does not necessarily follow. First, the
Court simply did not adopt the classic doctrine even in dicta. 4 2 In con-
trasting the federal government's powers over article I property with its
37. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). The decision was predicated
upon the common law rule that the Crown as sovereign holds title to the beds of navigable
waters in trust for the nation. Thus, "when the Revolution took place, the people of each
state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their
navigable waters and the soils under them . . . subject only to the rights since surrendered
by the Constitution to the general government." Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
38. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223.
39. Id. See also id. at 221 (iterating dichotomy between "municipal sovereignty" and
"right of soil"). Despite this broad language, the Supreme Court subsequently held that
the United States did possess the right of eminent domain, either as an inherent "attribute
of sovereignty," Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878), or as "the offspring of
political necessity." Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371 (1875). Both decisions were
rendered during Professor Engdahl's classic period.
40. Engdahl, supra note 1, at 295-96. The argument continues to obscure the distinc-
tion between "exclusive legislation" and any "governmental authority."
41. If the first two propositions were incorrect, there would be no need for the article
I clause because the article IV clause would be sufficient to meet the presumed goals of the
article I clause. Similarly, because there is no contention that the article IV clause
preempts state law by its own force, it is undisputed that the state continues to exercise
general legislative authority over all land within its borders; such state legislation is pre-
empted only to the extent that it is inconsistent with actual federal legislation. E.g., Omae-
chevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. at 346.
42. Professor Engdahl acknowledges this difficulty but nonetheless argues that "[t]he
Court's rationale in Pollard... carried definite implications for the entire public domain."
Engdahl, supra note 1, at 295. The "implications" lay in the governmental/proprietary
dichotomy:
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powers over article IV property, the Court merely stated that Congress
lacked general governmental jurisdiction over article IV lands;4 3 that is,
the federal power under article IV is less than that under article I. The
Court did not, however, say either that the state has the same power
over article IV federal land as it has over private land or that the federal
government has only the powers of a common proprietor over article IV
land.
The proponents' conclusion follows only if one is willing to accept
the mutual exclusivity theorem in a slightly different guise: because the
state has "general governmental authority," the federal government can
only be a proprietor. The classic theorists thus argue that general gov-
ernmental authority necessarily excludes any other governmental juris-
diction. However, the fact that states exercise general jurisdiction does
not in of itself preclude federal jurisdiction over a more limited subject.
For example, states have general authority to define criminal conduct,
but this fact does not preclude the federal government from also defin-
ing some conduct as federal crimes. Similarly, the fact that the state
possesses general authority over all of the land within the state is not
inconsistent with paramount federal authority over federal property lo-
cated within that state. To reach the opposite conclusion, it is necessary
to read Pollard for its contrary.
Even granting the classic theorists their interpretation of the ration-
ale in Pollard does not necessarily lead to the conclusion they advocate.
44
As to [the public domain] land ...title had to be distinguished from gov-
ernmental jurisdiction. To hold that the governmental jurisdiction which the
United States had enjoyed over a territory could be retained over vast expanses of
the public domain when that territory was organized into a state would be to
place such a state on a different footing from the original, nonpublic domain
states, much more clearly than would the retention of federal jurisdiction over
[submerged lands].
Id. Professor Engdahl's argument thus bottoms on the equal footing theory: federal gov-
ernmental power over article IV lands violates the equal footing doctrine. See infra notes
45-53 and accompanying text.
43. The Court's actual language is instructive because it is far less expansive than
implied by proponents of the classic doctrine. After quoting the article I property clause,
the Court stated that
these are the only cases, within the United States, in which all the powers of gov-
ernment are united in a single government, except in the cases already mentioned
of the temporary territorial governments, and there a local government exists.
The right of Alabama and every other new state to exercise all the powers of
government, which belong to and may be exercised by the original states of the
union, must be admitted, and remain unquestioned, except so far as they are,
temporarily, deprived of control over the public lands.
Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223-24 (emphasis added). The Court thus distin-
guished between exclusive and nonexclusive federal jurisdiction, instead of between gov-
ernmental and proprietary functions.
44. The other cases cited by advocates are similarly inapplicable. Engdahl, for exam-
ple, states that "[tihe basic proposition ... that article IV property not being utilized for
an enumerated federal governmental purpose was by constitutional reservation subject to
the general governmental jurisdiction of the state wherein it lay, was reaffirmed in llWard v.
Race Horse, [163 U.S. 504] in 1896." Engdahl, supra note 1, at 303.
Contrary to Professor Engdahl's reading of the case, Ward does not enunciate a "con-
stitutional rule that a state cannot be precluded from exercising and enforcing its general
governmental jurisdiction over federal lands within its borders." Id. at 357 n.322. ll'ard
involved a habeas corpus proceeding on behalf of an Indian who had killed an elk in viola-
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The Pollard Court may well have assumed that states had complete gov-
ernmental authority over the public lands within their borders and that
the federal government occupied the role of a mere proprietor. At best,
however, the Court presumed; it did not decide or clearly state that con-
clusion. Because the constitutional text provides no explicit support for
their conclusion, the assumptions of the Pollard Court and the argu-
ments of the classic theorists demonstrate only that the constitutional
text is contingent: a dichotomy not stated in the text was read into it in
the mid-nineteenth century. In of itself, this provides no reason for pre-
ferring the assumptions of the Pollard Court to those of the Kleppe Court.
B. Equal Footing
Ultimately, the classic theorists' case analysis and arguments resolve
into claims based upon the equal footing doctrine. Because the federal
government had neither dominium nor imperium over lands within the
original states, the classic theorists argue that new states are less than
equal if the government retains either imperium or dominium over lands
within their borders: "if either title to or jurisdiction over common lands
in the new states could be retained by the United States, those new
states would be received into the Union on less than an equal footing
with the original states."
4 5
tion of state game laws. The Indian relied upon a treaty that antedated the admission of
Wyoming into the Union and "the sole question ... is whether the treaty ... gave [the
Indians] the right to exercise the hunting privilege . .. within the limits of the State of
Wyoming in violation of its laws." 163 U.S. at 507. The Court held that the treaty was
impliedly repealed by the admission act. The decision thus is inapposite because it turns
upon the treaty clause, instead of the article IV property clause. Cf Hunt v. United States,
278 U.S. 96 (1928) (the United States has a right to protect federal property by killing deer
in violation of state game laws). In addition, despite Ward's broad equal footing language,
it does not state the classic doctrine. Instead, the Court was careful to hold, not that Con-
gress could not have achieved the result urged by the Indians, but instead that it did not
purport to do so:
Nor need we stop to consider the argument advanced at bar, that as the United
States, under the authority delegated to it by the Constitution in relation to In-
dian tribes, has a right to deal with that subject, therefore it has the power to
exempt from the operation of state game laws each particular piece of land,
owned by it in private ownership within a State,for nothing in this case shows that this
power has been exerted by Congress.
163 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court noted the "silence of the act ad-
mitting Wyoming into the Union, as to the reservation of rights in favor of the Indians"
and concluded that "the enabling act not only contains no expression of the intention of
Congress to continue the burdens in question . . . but, on the contrary, its intention not
to do so is conveyed by the express terms of the act of admission." Id. at 515. In fact, the
Court noted that equal footing would not be infringed by exempting from state control
"rights created by Congress, during the existence of a Territory, which are of such a na-
ture as to imply their perpetuity," despite the silence of the new state's enabling act. Id. at
515-16. For an example of such a right, see United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 382-84
(1905) (upholding against an equal footing challenge the creation of federal fishing rights
akin to easements which prevented the state from licensing a fishing machine, to the exclu-
sion of treaty fishers).
Reliance upon similar dictum in Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228 (1925), Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 91-92 (1907), and Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525,
531 (1885) is equally unavailing without assuming what the advocates seek to prove.
45. Brodie, supra note I, at 712. See also Engdahl, supra note 1, at 294; Note, Sagebrush
Rebellion, supra note I, at 520-21 & n.104.
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This interpretation requires an extension of the equal footing doc-
trine far beyond both its traditional scope and the holding of Pollard.
Traditionally, the equal footing doctrine has been applied to political
rights, to sovereignty: Congress may not impose conditions upon a state
in its admission act that render the state less than politically equal to the
other states.
46
The classic theorists' argument confuses factual equality (the pres-
ence or absence of federal lands) with political equality (the authority of
the states over article IV lands).4 7 So long as all states have the same
authority over article IV lands within their borders, the equal footing
doctrine is not offended.48 Just as Texas is no more sovereign than
Rhode Island despite their differences in size, so Connecticut is no more
sovereign than Idaho despite the fact that Connecticut has only ten acres
46. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911). See Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of
States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519 (1951); Monnet, Violations by a State of the Conditions of Its En-
abling Act, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1910).
Only Professor Patterson appears to challenge this proposition by arguing that the
doctrine "forbids either economic or political limitations on statehood." Patterson, supra
note 1, at 56. In support of this novel theory, he argues that this result is historically
mandated because
at the time this doctrine was established (1787) the Confederacy had no power
whatsoever over the states and, therefore, could not have placed limitations on
the admission of new states. . . and that when the Congress of the United States
readopted the Ordinance of 1787 in 1789, it pledged itself to the same doctrine,
thereby superseding the old Congress as the party to the compact.
Id. at 56.
There are at least three insurmountable difficulties with this argument. First, because
the Confederation lacked the power to admit new states other then by amendment to the
Articles of Confederation, the statement that the Confederacy could not have placed limi-
tations on the admission of new states is meaningless. Second, the language of the Ordi-
nance - "to provide ... for [the] admission [of new states] to a share in the federal
councils on an equal footing with the original States" - seems limited to political, instead
of economic equality. This view is supported by other provisions of the clause that forbid
new states from interfering with the disposition of federal land. See An Ordinance for the
Government of the Territory of the United States north-west of the river Ohio (July 13,
1787), reprinted in 1 Stat. 51 n.(a) (1789). Finally, the "readoption" of the Ordinance was
by statute and thus lacks constitutional stature. Id.
47. Patterson argues that the equal footing doctrine is not a constitutional matter.
States do not have equal representation in Congress because of the unequal representa-
tion in the House and because Senators are individuals who do not vote as states. Patter-
son, supra note 1, at 63-64. Furthermore, Patterson argues that Congress has imposed
conditions on the admission of new states that have violated their political equality vis-a-
vis the equal footing doctrine. Id. at 64-66. Therefore, he argues, it is only in the area of
reserved rights that states are equal. He then appears to conclude that state landholding is
a reserved right, though the analysis slips into the cant of an unreconstructed Southerner.
Id. at 66-71.
Patterson's argument embodies the confusion of factual and political equality. States
do not have numerically equal representation in Congress, but they have proportionally
equal representation, which is consistent with the fact that the federal government was
composed of "We the People of the United States" instead of the earlier and rejected
formulation "We the People of the States of. ... 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note
23, at 163; 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, at 336, 354-58. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 403-05 (1819) (The people rather than the states formed the federal
government.).
48. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755-57 (1866) ("There can be
no question of State sovereignty" where the state is prohibited from taxing Indians be-
cause of a stipulation in its admission act.).
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of National Forest land and Idaho has more than twenty million acres. 4 9
The equal footing doctrine does not require such factual equality. If, on
the other hand, Congress were to admit Idaho upon the condition that
Idaho not tax or zone federal lands, while simultaneously allowing Con-
necticut to do so, the equal footing doctrine would be violated. As the
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, "[tihe requirement of equal foot-
ing was designed not to wipe out [factual] diversities but to create parity
as respects political standing and sovereignty."
50
The advocates' interpretation of the equal footing doctrine is also
more expansive than that adopted in Pollard. In Pollard, the Court held
that Alabama held title to the beds of navigable waters because the origi-
nal thirteen states possessed such lands as an attribute of their sover-
eignty. 5 1 The decision thus was predicated upon the special status of
submerged lands as incidents of sovereignty. There is no similar doc-
trine holding that ownership of fast lands (that land which is above mean
high water) is an incident of sovereignty. Pollard, therefore, did not es-
tablish a general right to title that a state might assert against the federal
government as a matter of equal footing.
5 2
In Pollard, the Court neither adopted nor depended upon the classic
theorists' doctrine. Regardless of what the Court may have tacitly as-
49. 1980 U.S. DEPT. INTERIOR PUB. LAND STATISTICS 13 (1981).
50. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950). The Court explained that:
The "equal footing" clause has long been held to refer to political rights and to
sovereignty . . . . It does not, of course, include economic stature or standing.
There has never been equality among the States in that sense. Some States when
they entered the Union had within their boundaries tracts of land belonging to
the Federal Government; others were sovereigns of their soil. Some had special
agreements with the Federal Government governing property within their bor-
ders. See Stearns v. Minnesota, [179 U.S. 223], 243-45 [(1900)]. Area, location,
geology, and latitude have created great diversity in the economic aspects of the
several States.
Id.
In Stearns, which was decided during Professor Engdahl's classic period, the Court
specifically noted that Congress had the power not to sell the public lands within the state.
179 U.S. at 243. This did not violate the equal footing doctrine because that doctrine
forbids "any agreement or compact limiting or qualifying political rights and obligations,"
but does not apply to agreements "in reference to property." Id at 245. The classic theo-
rists' world is like that Kurt Vonnegut has described where ballerinas wear ankle weights
so that they cannot outdance anyone else. K. VONNEGUT, WELCOME TO THE MONKEY
HOUSE 8 (Dell ed. 1970).
51. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. At the common law, "all navigable riv-
ers and havens were computed among the regalia, and were subject to the sovereign." I W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *264. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-11
(1842).
52. Title to nonsubmerged lands was not an incident of sovereignty and thus did not
pass to the new states upon admission. Similarly, the old states lacked absolute jurisdic-
tion over federal property, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428-30 (1819),
and the new states thus cannot claim greater authority as an instance of equal footing.
United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1950).
Finally, the holding in Pollard has been sharply limited in the Tidelands Cases: United
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950);
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947). See also United States v. Maine, 420 U.S.
515 (1975). In these cases, the Supreme Court held that the littoral states did not hold
title to the sea bed adjacent to their shores even if they had held title to the lands prior to
their admission into the Union. Any equal footing claim to nonsubmerged lands stands on
an even weaker basis and finds little support even in the dicta of Pollard.
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sumed, the issue pressed by the classic theorists was not presented to
the Court. Similarly, the expansive interpretation of the equal footing
doctrine is neither stated in, nor necessary to the decision. 53 The pro-
ponents' analysis of the case law thus fails to provide a persuasive justifi-
cation for accepting the classic doctrine.
C. The Actual Pattern
The classic theorists' difficulties are compounded by the fact that
the theory is inconsistent with a number of cases decided by the Court
during the classic period. 54 Under the classic theory, the federal gov-
ernment has at best only the same rights of any other proprietor and its
decisions regarding the land may be overridden by state law. The fed-
eral government, therefore, would have the right to control the disposi-
tion of its land only to the extent that it was not inconsistent with state law. In
other words, a state has the power to establish general, nondiscrimina-
tory regulatory requirements applicable to all land within its borders.
Under the classic theory, such rules would be applicable to federal as
well as private land. This state power includes the right to specify the
formal requirements for transfers and to determine what, for example, is
to be sufficient evidence of title for an ejectment action brought in state
court. It thus is significant that the courts during the classical period
consistently held that the states lacked such power: federal land was dif-
ferent from private land because federal rules and not state rules deter-
mined when title passed and what was sufficient evidence of vesting.
55
53. The equal footing argument is also undercut by the fact that the drafters of the
Constitution considered and specifically rejected constitutionally mandating the admission
of new states on an equal footing. See generally infra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
54. In addition to cases decided under the property clause, e.g., United States v. Gra-
tiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840); Wilcox v. M'Connel, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498 (1839); Bag-
nell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436 (1839), cases construing other constitutional
provisions produced results inconsistent with the classic theory. For example, in Green v.
Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823), the Court was faced with a challenge to the compact
between Virginia and Kentucky under which the latter state was admitted into the Union.
One of the articles of the compact provided that the then-existing Virginia property laws
were to apply to all property interests derived from Virginia. Henry Clay for Kentucky
argued that this was unconstitutional because "there are some attributes of sovereignty, of
which a State cannot be deprived, even with the concurrence of Congress and the State
itself." Id. at 42. The most "indisputable" of these attributes, Clay argued, was the power
to act within its own territory: "The sovereignty of a State cannot exist without a territorial
domain upon which it is to act." Id. Thus, the restriction upon the state's power to pass
laws controlling property rights was necessarily unconstitutional as an invasion of the
state's inherent sovereignty and the equal footing doctrine. The Court rejected this argu-
ment, noting that it was a "trite maxim [that] man gives up a part of his natural liberty
when he enters into civil society, as the price of the blessings of that state." Id. at 63. It
concluded that "[tihere can be no doubt that sovereign States may make pacts with each
other, limiting and restraining their rights of sovereignty as to proprietary interests in the
soil," citing the agreements by the new states not to tax federal lands as an example. Id. at
63-64. The Court's analysis in Green is inconsistent with the proposition that the right to
regulate all property within its boundaries is an inherent and inalienable attribute of
sovereignty.
55. This issue was initially decided in Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436, 450
(1839). In the same term, the Court also decided Wilcox v. M'Connel, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
498 (1839), where one claimant's case was based in part upon an Illinois statute:
It has been said, that the state of Illinois has a right to declare by law that a title
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Although some classic theorists treat such cases as an exception to
the classic doctrine, 56 the "exception" ultimately consumes the theory.
During the period when the classic doctrine was ostensibly being enun-
ciated, Congress was almost exclusively engaged in disposing of the
public lands. 5 7 The cases viewed as establishing the classic doctrine
thus generally involved situations where title was being transferred.
The cases do not establish explicit limitations on congressional conduct.
Instead of limiting congressional power, they reflect judicial support for
congressional actions by affirming the existing congressional policy of
disposing of federal lands. The cases contain no suggestion that Con-
gress was constitutionally limited to the policy it was then following. In
fact, when arguments seeking such limits were advanced, the Court re-
jected them. In United States v. Gratiot,5 8 for example, the defendant ar-
gued that Congress did not have the power to lease lead mines on the
public lands because "[n]o authority in the cession of the public lands to
the United States is given, but to dispose of them, and to make rules and
regulations respecting the preparation of them for sale.' '59 The Court
rejected this argument, upholding congressional authority to lease:
derived from the United States, which by [federal] laws is only inchoate and im-
perfect, shall be deemed as perfect a title as if a patent had issued from the United
States; and the construction of her own Courts seems to give that effect to her
statute. That state has an undoubted right to legislate as she may please in regard
to the remedies to be prosecuted in her Courts, and to regulate the disposition of
the property of her citizens by descent, devise, or alienation. But the property in
question was a part of the public domain of the United States: Congress is in-
vested by the Constitution with the power of disposing of, and making needful
rules and regulations respecting it. Congress has declared . . . by its legislation,
that in such a case as this a patent is necessary to complete the title. But in this
case no patent has issued; and therefore by the laws of the United States the legal
title has not passed, but remains in the United States. Now if it were competent
for a state legislature to say, that notwithstanding this, the title shall be deemed to
have passed; the effect of this would be, not that Congress had the power of dis-
posing of the public lands, and prescribing the rules and regulations concerning
that disposition, but that Illinois possessed it. That would be to make the laws of
Illinois paramount to those of Congress, in relation to a subject confided by the
Constitution to Congress only. . . . We hold the true principle to be this, that
whenever the question in any Court, state or federal, is, whether a title to land
which had once been the property of the United States has passed, that question
must be resolved by the laws of the United States; but that whenever, according
to those laws, the title shall have passed, then that property, like all other prop-
erty in the state, is subject to state legislation.
Id. at 516-17. The Court's "true principle" sets up a dichotomy between federal lands and
other lands that is inconsistent with the classic property clause theory.
56. Professor Engdahl offers inconsistency as a justification for the exception: "As a
practical matter ... a rule [subjecting federal conveyances to state law] would have intro-
duced far more intricacy and confusion into public land affairs than was already present
under the federal laws alone." Engdahl, supra note 1, at 296. The increased intricacy,
however, exists only from the federal perspective because it, like any other proprietor with
land in more than one jurisdiction, would be potentially subject to differing requirements
in different states. Within any state, the rule which would follow logically if the classic
doctrine had actually been the theory relied upon by the Court would have produced less
intricacy and confusion because all land would be subject to the same state law instead of
two potentially divergent laws. Professor Engdahl's rationalization of the "exception"
thus seems particularly weak.
57. E.g., P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAw DEVELOPMENT 121-463 (1968 &
photo. reprint 1979).
58. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
59. Id. at 532.
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"Congress has the same power over [territory] as over any other prop-
erty belonging to the United States; and this power is vested in Con-
gress without limitation." 60 As if to demonstrate the absurdity of the
defendant's claim, the Court noted that Illinois "surely cannot claim a
right to the public lands within her limits."' It is difficult to read such
unqualified acceptance of congressional action as limiting Congress to
its then-current policy of disposal.
This judicial deference to congressional authority is also demon-
strated by a second "exception." If the federal government were a mere
proprietor subject as all other proprietors to state law, federal manage-
ment decisions would be restricted by general state laws. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court held during the classical period that federal laws
protecting the public lands preempted state laws. This decision was
reached initially in a case 62 that arose during a period when Congress
had begun to retain federal resources. 63 Disposal was no longer the
sole federal policy; retention and management had their place. The
Court responded to the shifting policy by upholding congressional au-
thority to protect the federal public lands in the face of inconsistent state
law:
we do not think that the admission of a Territory as a State
deprives [Congress] of the power of legislating for the protec-
tion of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of
what is ordinarily known as the police power, so long as such power is
directed solely to its own protection."
The emphasized language is significant because it distinguishes between
land ownership rights of private landowners on one hand, and the rights
of the federal government as a landowner on the other hand. All land-
owners may protect their lands, but a private proprietor can neither em-
ploy sovereign power, nor override state law.
60. Id. at 537.
61. Id. at 538.
62. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
63. For example, Congress in 1872 set aside Yellowstone Park as a "pleasuring-
ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people." Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat.
32. This was followed by the more important General Revision Act of 1891 which re-
pealed the Preemption and Timber Culture Acts and authorized the President to "set
apart and reserve. . . any part of the public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or
undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not, as public reservations." Act of Mar. 3,
1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (formerly codified at 16 U.S.C. § 471). The con-
stitutionality of this provision was upheld in Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911),
against the claims that (1) the federal government "holds title to public lands, not as a
sovereign, but as a proprietor merely" and thus the laws of the state preempted inconsis-
tent federal actions, id. at 527-28; and (2) the federal government held title to the public
lands "in trust for the people, to be disposed of so as to promote the settlement and
ultimate prosperity of the States in which they are situated." Id. at 530. The Court re-
jected both arguments as inconsistent with the "rights incident to proprietorship, to say
nothing of the power of the United States as a sovereign over the property belonging to
it." Id. at 537.
64. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1896) (emphasis added).
Although noting that this power is less expansive within a state than it is within a Territory,
id. at 525, the Court justifies the holding by stating that "[a] different rule would place the
public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation." Id. at
526.
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Thus, during the height of the classic period, the Court consistently
upheld congressional actions regarding federal public lands under the
article IV clause, disregarding any potentially inconsistent state law. The
Court's exceptions to upholding congressional actions cited by propo-
nents of the classic doctrine swallow up the doctrine because the excep-
tions reflect the basic proposition that it is for Congress, instead of the
Court, to decide how the federal public lands are to be administered.
The actual pattern was a reflection ofjudicial deference to congressional
policy instead of a recognition of constitutional limitations on congres-
sional authority.
III. HISTORICAL ARGUMENTS: MYTH As HISTORY
Perhaps recognizing the problems inherent in the case law, some
classic theorists have attempted to buttress their argument with a review
of the history leading to the drafting of the Constitution's property
clauses. 65 Their history, however, is mythology.
The central thrust of the classic theorists' argument is continuity:
"[t]he history of the American people since the establishment of the
original thirteen colonies to the present date [supports] the conclusion
that the colonies during the colonial period, and the states thereafter,
have been the land-owning units."' 66 The doctrine's proponents thus
contend that the basic relationship of the colonial or state governments
to the central government remained unchanged through the three con-
stitutionally significant periods: the colonies, the Confederation, and the
Constitution.
The classic theorists view the first British Empire as a federation:
the colonies were "quasi-sovereign states within the British Empire"
sharing a common executive, but with separate legislative bodies. 6 7
They argue that the constitutional basis of this federation was the fact
that "landholding was the exclusive function of the colonial govern-
ments .... ."68 Given the importance of landholding to the colonies
within the Empire, the colonies retained control of the vacant lands
when they formed the Confederation. The limited role of the Confeder-
65. Engdahl states the point concisely: "It was not contemplated . . . that by acquir-
ing territory the United States should accumulate and permanently hold a vast national
domain. . . .[Instead] both federal title and the federal exercise of governmental jurisdic-
tion in these lands were regarded as temporary - a transitional phase." Engdahl, supra
note 1, at 292-93. The use of "It" as the subject of the sentence nicely ignores the ques-
tion of who was "It." His analysis similarly largely ignores the historical background of the
clauses. See id. at 288 n.10, 289 n.12, 291 n.24. The most detailed historical arguments
are presented by Brodie, supra note 1, at 695-96, 723-24; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson,
supra note 1, at 408-26; Patterson, supra note 1, at 43-53.
66. Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 408.
67. Patterson, supra note 1, at 44. Professors Hardwicke, Illig and Patterson go even
further, asserting that "the thirteen American colonies existed under the principle of fed-
eralism - as equal partners of Great Britain in a commonwealth of states." Hardwicke,
Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 408.
68. Patterson, supra note 1, at 45. See also Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at
408-09 (arguing that the colonies were the land-holding units under the principles of
federalism).
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ation Congress over the back lands was not expanded by the creation of
a federal constitutional government. With their emphasis on con-
tinuity, 69 the Revolution and the drafting of the Constitution play al-
most no role in the classic theorists' analysis.
Structuring their argument in this manner allows the proponents of
the classic doctrine to argue from silence. The fact that the Constitution
apparently denies the primacy of the states as landholders becomes ex-
plicable; apparently inconsistent constitutional provisions can be viewed
in a different light and given new meanings. Because the uniform expe-
rience had been that the colonies and states were the primary landown-
ers, the drafters of the Constitution simply assumed that the states,
instead of the federal government, would continue to play the leading
role. The constitution of the Empire thus was affirmed in the constitu-
tional compromise of the Confederation and reaffirmed by the drafters
of the Constitution.
Although the classic theorists largely ignore the fact, there was in-
deed a revolution that separated the colonies from the British Empire
and changed the relationship between local and central governments.
There was an additional discontinuity when the initial constitutional
structure was replaced because it was insufficiently "energetic." Thus,
the relationship between state and federal government changed again.
Even though the theorists are correct in arguing that much of the United
States' history prior to the adoption of the Constitution was shaped by
the struggle for political and economic control over the land,7
0 the pe-
riod was one of discontinuity.
Resolving the struggle for control over land and adjusting other
governmental relationships across these discontinuities produced the
fundamental constitutional compromise of the Confederation. It is
largely this compromise which was reaffirmed in article IV, section 3 of
the Constitution. 7 ' Although the classic theorists are correct in their
69. The classic doctrine advocates' arguments emphasize the continuity of the colo-
nies/states from empire through confederation to present constitutional system. For ex-
ample: "[T]he principle of federalism and the absolute right of the colonies to ownership
of land within their boundaries continued undisturbed through the period of confedera-
tion." Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 416. They later argue that this was
unchanged by the adoption of the Constitution: "In establishing the 'more perfect union'
provided by the Constitution . . . the states made no concessions therein as to lands or
property rights." Id. at 416-17.
70. See, e.g., Brodie, supra note 1, at 695; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at
409. See generally P. GATES, supra note 57, at 409; P. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC (1983) (recounting the struggle for control of lands during the colonial and
Confederation periods).
71.
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State
shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State
be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
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assessment of the constitutional importance of land issues, the history of
these issues in the period preceding the adoption of the Constitution is
far more complex and ambiguous than they wish to acknowledge.
A. The Colonial Background
The classic theorists begin their history with the assertion that
"landholding was the exclusive function of the colonial governments
under the Crown." 7 2  In support of this assertion, they cite the
"[t]ypical" Plymouth Charter of 1620 that granted both land and gov-
ernmental powers to the colony's incorporators.
73
Instead of being typical, however, the Plymouth charter was actually
quite exceptional in two crucial ways. First, it contained grants of both
land ownership and governmental powers to the same entity; these two
rights could be and often were separated. 74 Second, the charter was
granted to a group of incorporators, thus creating a corporate colony. 75
It was only in such colonies that stockholders controlled both the acqui-
sition of individual rights to land and the laws regulating the tenures
under which the land was subsequently held. Because only Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island were corporate colonies at the time of
the Revolution, 7 6 the discussion of colonial rights presented by the ad-
vocates of the classic doctrine - even if accurate - is of limited
applicability.
77
The choice of a "typical" colonial charter was hardly happenstance.
In contrast to the popular control that developed in the corporate colo-
nies, the two other generic forms of colonies were far more autocratic. 7 8
72. Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 408; Patterson, supra note 1, at 45.
73. Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 409.
74. For example, the Duke of York sold the territory that became New Jersey to John
Lord Berkely and Sir George Carteret in 1664. The indenture conveyed no governmental
rights. 6 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 375 (1976). See gen-
erally M. HARRIS, ORIGIN OF THE LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 129-32
(1953) (discussing NewJersey's various charters and the resulting land tenure system). In
addition, some colonies that began as corporate colonies ended up with a royal govern-
ment and proprietary or corporate land ownership. See infra note 78.
75. Such colonies were political and economic corporations created by the Crown
with full rights to the soil and frequently with extensive governmental powers. Blackstone
classed such corporations as "[c]harter governments, in the nature of civil corporations,
with the power of making bye-laws for their own interior regulations. . . and with such
rights and authorities as are specially given them in their several charters of incorpora-
tion." I W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 51. at * 108. See S. LIVERMORE. EARLY AMERICAN LAND
COMPANIES 19-30 (1939).
76. See generally M. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 98-116 (discussing the charters and land
tenure systems of the corporate colonies).
77. For example, it was only in the three corporate colonies that people did not hold
land under feudal tenures with quit rents due either to the King or the proprietor. "[T]he
absence of quit-rents [in the New England corporate colonies] is a unique feature of the
colonial land systems, and had an influence upon the radical political theories held in
[those] colonies." B. BOND, THE QUIT-RENT SYSTEM IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 35
(1919).
78. In addition to these generic types in which both the original ownership of land
and control over the government were in the same body or person, in five colonies land-
holding and government were in different hands. Although their histories differ in details,
the general pattern was similar. The colony began with a royal grant of territory either to
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Royal colonies, for example, were under the direct administrative con-
trol of the Crown: "the constitutions of [royal colonies] depend on the
respective commissions issued by the crown to the governors, and the
instructions which usually accompany those commissions; under the au-
thority of which provincial assemblies are constituted, with the power of
making local ordinances." 79 The governmental authority that con-
trolled both the granting of land and the local land tenure system de-
pended entirely upon royal instructions and commissions; the Crown
approved both the granting of rights in land and all statutes adopted by
the local assemblies.8 0 At the time of the Revolution, New York and
Virginia were royal colonies. 8 1
The third generic type of colony was the proprietary colony. These
were governments "granted out by the crown to individuals, in the na-
ture of feudatory principalities, with all the inferior regalities, and
subordinate powers of legislation. ' 8 2 The proprietors occupied the po-
sition of king in the colony except that they "had more right in the es-
tablishment of tenures in their colonies than the King had regarding the
land of England."'8 3 The proprietor, thus, granted land and reviewed
colonial statutes. At the time of the Revolution, Delaware, Maryland,
and Pennsylvania were proprietary colonies.
8 4
Thus, the "typical" corporate charter relied upon by the classic the-
orists was markedly different from the more autocratic charters held by
most colonies. The New England corporate charters are also less promi-
nent in the constitutional compromise of the Confederation than the
royal charter of Virginia.8 5 Indeed, if one charter ought to be examined,
Virginia's charter is the logical choice.
Given its prominence in the land issue, Virginia's colonial experi-
ence is instructive. Although the colony began as a speculative joint-
stock company under a charter issued in 1612 byJames 1,86 the company
was stripped of its charter in 1625.87 Virginia became a royal colony
a proprietor or to a group of incorporators; generally the grant included governmental
powers. At some later point, the Crown resumed governmental authority over the colony,
but ownership of the land remained in the royal grantee. In these five colonies - Georgia,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North and South Carolina - the proprietors continued to
sell land after the government passed under royal control. See M. HARRIS, supra note 74, at
127-40.
79. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at *108. Blackstone terms such colonies "pro-
vincial establishments."
80. M. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 75.
81. See generally id. at 82-97 (discussing New York and Virginia charters and the result-
ing land tenure systems).
82. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 51, at * 108. See S. LIVERMORE, supra note 75, at 30-
36; Molovinski, Maryland and the American West at Independence, 72 MD. HIST. MAG. 353, 355
(1977); Zimmerman, James Logan, Proprietary Agent, 78 PA. MAG. HIST. & Bio. 143 (1954).
83. M. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 76.
84. See generally id. at 117-26 (discussing the Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania
charters and the resulting land tenure systems).
85. It was Virginia's claim that the other states sought to discredit or buttress since it
was viewed as the paradigm. See P. ONUF, supra note 70, at 75-102.
86. 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 37 (1979).
87. Virginia Company, 2 Rolle 455, 81 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1624).
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ruled by royal governors under a series of imperial orders. 8 8 These or-
ders were often concerned with land and with securing the Crown's in-
come from it. 89 The Crown, however, was an absentee landowner and
was forced to rely upon its local representatives. 9 0 The authority to
make grants of land was, therefore necessarily delegated to the King's
representative, the governor, in conjunction with a body of local "gen-
tlemen," the Council, which was appointed by the Crown. 9 1 Although
governor-in-council acted as agent for the Crown, they frequently vio-
lated their principal's instructions, often accumulating baronial hold-
ings.9 2 As one commentator has noted, "English authority, even though
the crown right was clear, did not prevail." 9 3 The fact that the Crown
often tolerated such fraud on the part of the local royal officials 9 4 hardly
supports the claim of an independent colonial right to parcel out land.
Furthermore, the colony never disputed the Crown's right to control
the disposition of land. 9 5 It was not until the Revolution that the
88. The colony's basic political structure evolved from an "Ordinance and Constitu-
tion" adopted in 1621 by the Virginia Company. 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS 46 (1979). The King continued the basic governmental structure
following the recall of the Company's charter. See generally R. BEVERLY, THE HISTORY AND
PRESENT STATE OF VIRGINIA 237-42 (London 1705).
89. See, e.g., 2 ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH COLONIAL GOVERNORS, 1670-1776, at
533-55, 588-91 (L. Labaree ed. 1935) [hereinafter cited as ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS].
90. Compare the situation in the proprietary colony of Pennsylvania. Zimmerman,
supra note 82.
91. R. BEVERLY, supra note 88, at 239, 241; Voorhis, Crown Versus Council in the Virginia
Land Policy, 3 WM. & MARY Q (3d Ser.) 499, 500-01 (1946).
92. Governor Spotswood, for example, ended his service to the Crown and retired to
his estate of some 86,650 acres. See Report from Committee Staff to Lords of the Commit-
tee of the Privy Council (June 20, 1729), in Public Records Office, Colonial Office, Class 5,
vol. 1366, at 26 [hereinafter cited as vol. Colonial Records]; Voorhis, supra note 91, at 511.
Council members often did at least as well. P. GATES, supra note 57, at 36-37.
93. Voorhis, supra note 91, at 513. Initially, land was not sold, but instead was
granted under a "headrights" system intended to encourage importation of people by
allowing the importer 50 acres for each person he brought into the colony at his expense.
Headrights applied to all persons, free, bonded, or slave. R. BEVERLY, supra note 88, at
277; M. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 194-209. "Extensive grants of land thus went to those
rich and influential men who stood at the center of large clusters of dependents bound to
work at their bidding." R. ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA, 1740-1790, at 20
(1982). The society thus created was a feudalistic patriarchy.
The headrights system also encouraged fraud, often with the active assistance of the
imperial officials. P. GATES, supra note 57, at 35-36; M. HARRIS, supra note 74, at 207-08;
Kammen, Virginia at the Close of the Seventeenth Century: An Appraisal by James Blair and John
Locke, 74 VA. MAG. HIST. & Bio. 141, 143-44, 154-55 (1966); Voorhis, supra note 91, at
500-02. The widespread abuses of the headright system led to the adoption of a proce-
dure under which the governor-in-council sold headright certificates for 5 shillings per 50
acres, approximately 1 penny per acre. 3 W. HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 305 (Rich-
mond, Va. 1812). Although this act was disapproved by the Crown, the practice of selling
certificates continued and gradually replaced the headright system. M. HARRIS, supra note
74, at 245; Voorhis, supra note 91, at 505-07.
94. The Crown tended to be forgiving of the transgressions, approving many ques-
tionable transactions after the fact. See Report from the Board of Trade to the Lords Com-
mittee for Plantation Affairs of the Privy Council (June 20, 1729), in 1366 COLONIAL
RECORDS, supra note 92, at 26, 31 (noting that the King in Council had ordered "that no
advantage should be taken of the Invalidity of [Spotswood's] Grants, and that for the bet-
ter confirmation of such of them as were defective, the [new] Governor . . .should pass
new & Authentick Patents to the said Col. Spotswood or his Assigns").
95. There was no protest, for example, of the subsequent grants that created Mary-
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Crown's complete discretion over land was challenged. Even then the
Declaration of Independence's challenge goes not to the Crown's right,
but to the effect of its policy: one of the "repeated injuries and usurpa-
tions" of which the Crown was accused was endeavoring "to prevent the
population of these states [by] raising the conditions of new appropria-
tions of lands."
9 6
land, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina and that abrogated the colony's charter bounda-
ries. Virginia similarly did not dispute the right of the Crown to create new colonies within
its trans-Appalachian claims. For example, in 1770 when the Colonial Secretary, Lord
Hillsborough, wrote asking the colony's response to the request for a grant of 2.4 million
acres, the President of the Virginia Council responded that the colony did "not presume to
say to whom our gracious sovereign shall grant the vacant lands." Letter from William
Nelson to Lord Hillsborough (Oct. 18, 1770), reprinted in 1348 COLONIAL RECORDS, supra
note 92, at 321, 328. Although he obviously was not happy with the proposal and raised
numerous logistical problems, President Nelson did not question the Crown's right to
make the grant. Indeed, the major portion of the letter was taken up with a detailed justifi-
cation of earlier colonial grants that was intended to demonstrate that they had complied
with the then-existing royal instructions.
Furthermore, Virginians sought specific grants directly from the Crown when the
grant seemed nonroutine. Thus, when the symbolic barrier of the Appalachian Mountains
was to be crossed, the lieutenant-governor advised the Board of Trade. Noting that he
had received requests for grants of land "lying on the Western Side of the Great Moun-
tains," he informed the Board that "he did not think proper to comply therewith untill he
had receiv'd His Majesty's Orders thereupon." Letter from Gooch to Board of Trade
(Nov. 6, 1747), reprinted in 1326 COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 92, at 277. At the same
time, a group organized as the "Ohio Company" petitioned the King for a grant of
500,000 acres "on the Waters of the Mississippi." Petition of John Hanbury to King in
Council, reprinted in 1327 COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 92, at 31. The King assented and
the Governor was instructed to issue the desired grant. Report of King in Council (Mar.
16, 1748), reprinted in 1937 COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 92, at 57; also in 2 ROYAL IN-
STRUCTIONS, supra note 89, at 645. See also Additional Instruction to the Lieutenant Gover-
nor of Virginia (Dec. 13, 1748), in 1327 COLONIAL RECORDS, supra note 92, at 39
(authorizing Gooch to make the grant to the Ohio Company). See generally T. ABERNETHY,
WESTERN LANDS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 7-9 (1937); K. BAILEY, THE OHIO COM-
PANY OF VIRGINIA AND THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT, 1748-1792, at 15-82 (1939); 2 L. GIP-
SON, THE BRITISH EMPIRE BEFORE THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5-8 (rev. ed. 1960); 4 id. at
225-68; (rev. ed. 1967); A. HENDERSON, DR. THOMAS WALKER AND THE LOYAL COMPANY OF
VIRGINIA (1931); P. JOHNSON, JAMES PATRON AND THE APPALACHIAN COLONISTS (1973); S.
LIVERMORE, supra note 75, at 75-82 (discussing various aspects of the pre-Revolutionary
history of the lands west of the Appalachian Mountains and the effects of the struggle to
control those lands on the politics of the period).
96. The Declaration of Independence para. 12 (U.S. 1776). Some revolutionaries did
challenge the authority of the Crown. Initially the claim was that the Crown could not
change "the Law and Constitution of this Country ... by any proclamation, Instruction,
or other Act of Government" because "the King [is] as much bound by the Act of his Royal
Predecessors, as any Private Subject." T. JEFFERSON, Petition of George Mason (June,
1774), in I THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 112, 115 (1950) [hereinafter cited as vol.
JEFFERSON PAPERS]. The petition apparently was never delivered. Id. at 115-16. See Letter
from George Mason to Martin Cockburn (May 26, 1774), in K. ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF
GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792, at 168 (1892); Sioussat, The Breakdown of the Royal Management
of Lands in the Southern Provinces, 1773-1775, 3 AGRIC. HIST. 67 (1929).
The next step came quickly. InA Summary View of the Rights of British America,Jefferson
argued that land in America was allodial instead of feudal and thus the king "has no right
to grant lands of himself;" only society as a collective has that right. A Summary View of the
Rights of British America (July, 1774), in JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra, at 121, 133. Jefferson
sought to explain the previous failure to protest this usurpation on the ground that "[o]ur
ancestors . . . were laborers, not lawyers . . . .And while the crown continued to grant
for small sums and on reasonable rents, there was no inducement to arrest the error and
lay it open to public view." Id. These more radical views were not expressed in the Decla-
ration of Independence.
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Thus, the simple picture of the colonies as the "exclusive" land-
holding unit is myth. It refuses to acknowledge that in all but three col-
onies the authority to create any rights in land was held by the local
imperial or proprietary officials instead of the popularly controlled unit
of government. Such centralized control over land is hardly surprising
because land was the dominant source of private wealth and governmen-
tal revenue: fees were required for a grant and the Crown or proprietor
retained annual quit rents.9 7 Thus, the argument from silence actually
undercuts advocates of the classic doctrine because the most common
experience was with centralized control over the acquisition of rights to
land, a system that would not seem alien to those creating a new
government.
The fact that it was generally the central government that held the
ultimate right to grant private rights to land does not resolve the central
question. Instead, the fact that the Crown or proprietor was the source
of rights in land and that this authority passed from the Crown at the
time of the Revolution simply shifts the question: to whom did authority
pass? Resolution of this dispute was the fundamental constitutional is-
sue of the Confederation.
B. The Confederation. Creation of the Public Domain
The existence of large tracts of unsettled lands presented the newly
independent states with a major political and constitutional problem:
what was to be done with the back lands? There was a general consen-
sus, though not unanimity, that the lands would eventually be carved
into states; 98 the revolutionary ideology would permit no less. 9 9 The
97. E.g., ROYAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 89, at 553-55, 588-91.
98. For example, the Virginia constitution of 1776 provided for the establishment of
one or more governments westward of the Alleghany mountains." VA. CONST. (1776),
reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 51, 56 (1979).
The first draft of the Articles of Confederation similarly provided for the formation of new
western states. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 551 (1776)
[hereinafter cited as vol. JOURNALS (date)]. In the same year, Silas Deane proposed that
some of the back lands be sold to finance the war and that the portion sold be formed into
a "distinct state." Letter from Silas Deane to Secret Committee (Dec. 1, 1776), in 3 AMER-
ICAN ARCHIVES (5th Ser.) 1021 (P. Force ed. Washington, D.C. 1853). In opposing Vir-
ginia's land claims, Maryland argued that the back lands should be laid out "into separate
and independent states." 9 JOURNALS, supra at 807 (1777). The Finance Committee sug-
gested in 1778 that "it be covenanted with the States that the Lands set offshall be erected
into separate independent States .... " 12JOURNALS, supra, at 931 (1778). Richard Lee
also advocated settling the lands north of the Ohio River "for the common good and made
a new State." Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Nov. 15, 1778), in 1 THE
LETrERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 451, 452-53 (1911) [hereinafter cited as LEE LETTERS].
99. In addition to the obvious inconsistency of claiming independence while subject-
ing others to colonial control, the prevailing political theory held that a republic had to be
small. As Richard Henry Lee noted in a letter to Patrick Henry, Virginia's western claims
were too large given "the difficulty of republican laws and government piercing so far
from the seat of governmen[t]." Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Nov.
15, 1778), in LEE LETTERS, supra note 98, at 453. See Letter of Joseph Jones to Thomas
Jefferson (June 30, 1780), in 3 JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 96, at 472; G. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 499-506 (1969). But see infra note
156.
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dispute thus centered on who was to control and thus profit from the
state-making process.
During the Confederation, these problems were debated in terms of
three questions. The first was the question of who was to control devel-
opment of the lands; this was generally stated as a question of property:
who owned the back lands? The second and third questions focused on
constitutional structures. The consensus that the land would eventually
be carved into states left unresolved the internal structure of the govern-
ments and their relationship to Congress. Would such lands be in-
dependent self-governing political units or would they be held at least
transitionally as colonies? Finally, if the back lands were to become self-
governing political units, would they be admitted into the Union; and if
so, would they be the equals of the original thirteen states?
The final two questions were largely dependent upon the first.
Thus, the major political issue that initially confronted the members of
the proposed Confederation was who was to control the disposition of
the back lands: to whom did title pass? Virginia and the other states
with sea-to-sea charters argued that it passed to the states severally; that
is, to the state within whose charter boundaries the land was located.10 0
These claims were opposed by the six landless states led by Maryland' 0 '
and by a number of speculative land companies formed near the end of
the colonial period. 10 2 The landless states argued that title passed to
the states collectively, either legally or equitably.
100. At the time of the Revolution, seven colonies asserted some claim to the lands
west of the Appalachians: Connecticut, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, North and
South Carolina, and Virginia. Connecticut based its claims upon its 1662 corporate char-
ter from Charles II that had granted the incorporators all lands "to the South Sea on the
West." 2 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 131, 136 (1973).
Georgia's claim was predicated upon its sea-to-sea charter issued by George II in 1732. See
id. at 433. The Massachusetts claim was predicated upon the charter it received following
the Glorious Revolution of 1689. The charter was issued by William and Mary in 1691 and
reaffirmed the 1620 charter ofJames I. The new charter restated the bounds of the 1620
charter, granting all the territory between the fortieth and the forty-eighth latitude
"throughout all the Main Lands from Sea to Sea." 5 id. at 75 (1975). The North and
South Carolina title was founded upon the same charter, a sea-to-sea grant by the restored
Charles II in 1663 to eight of his most loyal followers. See 7 id. at 357 (1978). The Virginia
claim was predicated upon the sea-to-sea limits in its third charter (1612) from James I to
"The Treasurer and Company of Adventurers and Planters of the City of London for the
first Colony in Virginia." 10 id. 37 (1979). New York's claim differed from the other claim-
ants because it was based upon its feudal status as suzerain for the Iroquois Confederacy
dating from a 1701 treaty with the Confederacy which included a deed to the King of the
Confederacy's beaver hunting ground. The Treaty Utrecht (1713) between France and
Great Britain terminating the War of Spanish Succession/Queen Anne's War recognized
this relationship. Conference of Lieutenant Governor Nansan with the Indians (1701), in
4 DOCUMENTS RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 896, 908
(Albany 1854); Report of Governor William Tyron on the State of the Province of New
York (1774), in I DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 737, 741-43 (Albany
1849).
101. In addition to Maryland, the colonies with fixed western boundaries were New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware.
102. These land companies generally predicated their claims upon grants secured from
Indian tribes. Most members of the land companies were drawn from the landless states
and it is often difficult to determine whether a particular position was a result of principle
or interest. See generally infra note 109.
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The Confederation presents classic theorists with a major problem
because the dispute was resolved when the Confederation Congress ac-
cepted quit claim cessions from the landed states while it carefully
avoided acknowledging the validity of any of the ceded rights. Thus, the
landed states achieved formal confederation, while the landless states
achieved their stated goal of ensuring that the back lands would be used
in the national interest. In this manner, the Confederation received the
first public domain. The classic theorists attempt to avoid this difficulty
by emphasizing continuity, arguing that the compromise was not in-
tended to change the status of the states as the primary landholding
units.10 3 In their analysis, the Confederation resolved the three ques-
tions by transferring title to Congress, but so limited that body's author-
ity through answers to the second and third questions that the states'
position remained fundamentally unaltered. 10 4 Thus, the fact that the
members of the Confederation decided that it was the central govern-
ment that was to control the uses of the back lands is comparatively un-
important. 10 5 The classic theorists base their contentions on the
language of the congressional resolution of October 10, 1780, calling
upon the landed states to cede their unappropriated lands t06 and the
103. See Brodie, supra note 1, at 695-96; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at
414-16; Patterson, supra note 1, at 46-53.
104. There is only one conclusion that can be drawn from both the resolutions of
the Congress and the deeds of cession of the seven landed states: these lands
were to be disposed of by the Congress for the benefit of the states and this trust
was so specifically conditioned that Congress could not convert it into an owner-
ship without changing the entire character of the proposed scheme of the distri-
bution of these lands and hence the process of the further development of the
Union of States.
Patterson, supra note 1, at 50. Cf Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 416 ("the
principle of federalism and the absolute right of the colonies to ownership of land within
their boundaries continued undisturbed thought the period of confederation").
105. Patterson, supra note 1, at 50. There is an inherent contradiction in Professor
Patterson's analysis. He begins by recognizing that "the Congress of the Confederation
was only the agent of the states." Id. at 46. Nevertheless, it is "axiomatic" that if owner-
ship were transferred to the Confederation, "Congress could do as it pleased with its own
lands." Id. Thus, a compact was necessary: by accepting the Virginia cession with its con-
ditions, "Congress was estopped from denying or violating its terms or conditions." Id. at
49.
But Congress as an agent could do only what the states that constituted it wanted it to
do - a fact that remained unchanged by any extra-constitutional compact that the Con-
gress might have made - so unless the terms of the cession had been embodied in the
Articles of Confederation, Congress was no more bound by its provisions than by any
other statute.
106. Patterson points in particular to the resolution adopted on October 10, 1780, by
the Congress. The resolution stated in part
[t]hat the unappropriated lands that may be ceded or relinquished to the United
States, by any particular states, pursuant to the recommendation of Congress the
6 day of September last, shall be disposed offor the common benefit of the United States,
and be settled and formed into distinct republican States, which shall become members of the
federal union, and shall have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as the
other states ....
i8JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 915 (1780), as quoted in Patterson, supra note I, at 47 (empha-
sis added by Patterson). Professor Patterson then states that this quote embodies "the
essence of the writer's contention that here is found the basis for only a trusteeship of
territory by Congress, [that is] for the exclusive purpose of statehood." Id.
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"typical" Virginia deed of cession. 10 7
Congress requested "a liberal surrender of a portion of their terri-
torial claims"' 0 8 and resolved that any ceded lands "shall be disposed of
for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed
into distinct republican states, which shall become members of the fed-
eral union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and inde-
107. Professor Patterson points to the Virginia cession, concluding that it specified
four conditions and arguing that
[t]he same conditions. . . were placed in the deeds of cession of the other states:
(1) "that the territory so ceded shall be laid out and formed into states"; (2) "that
the states so formed shall be distinct republican states, and admitted members of
the Federal Union, having the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and indepen-
dence as the other states"; (3) "that all lands within the territory so ceded . . .
shall be considered as a common fund for the use and benefit . . . of the United
States . . ."; and (4) that they "shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for
that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever."
Patterson, supra note 1, at 48-49 (quoting 2 THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
955-56 (1909)).
Contrary to Patterson's assertion, the conditions "typical" of the Virginia cession
were not typical of those employed in the other cession acts. For example, the New York
cession that covered the same area as the Virginia cession provided only that the territory
"shall be and enure for the use and benefit of such of the United States . . . and for no
other use or purpose whatsoever; [that the land was] to be granted, disposed of and appro-
priated in such manner only, as Congress of the United or confederated States shall order
and direct." New York Deed of Cession (Mar. 1, 1781), in 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE
UNITED STATES 3, 4-5 (C. Carter ed. 1934) [hereinafter cited as TERRITORIAL PAPERS]. See
19JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 208-13 (1781). Similarly, the Massachusetts and Connecti-
cut cessions provided only that the ceded territory was "for the common benefit" of the
Confederation. 28 id. at 281 (1785) (Massachusetts: "to be disposed of for the common
benefit of" the United States); 31 id. at 655 (1786) (Connecticut: "for the common use and
benefit of said states"). None of these cessions impose any obligation that the land be
disposed of, "formed into distinct republican states," or that any states actually created be
admitted into the Union on an equal footing. They required only that the land be used for
the common good and specified that Congress was the judge of the common good. If the
Connecticut, Massachusetts, or New York cessions were viewed as containing the terms of
the trust, Congress would have been justified in renting the territory and using the pro-
ceeds to sink the revolutionary war debt, a recurrent topic apparently first suggested by
Silas Deane in 1776, more than two years before the Articles of Confederation were finally
drafted. Letter from Silas Deane to Secret Committee (Dec. 1, 1776), in 3 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES (5th Ser.), supra note 98, at 1020-21, 1051.
The fact that not all the cessions constrained Congress as the Virginia cession at-
tempted to do is perhaps the reason that Professor Patterson asserts that one of the signifi-
cant results of the conditions was that "Congress recognized Virginia as the sole owner of
these lands." Patterson, supra note 1, at 49. The statement is simply incorrect. First, the
Confederation made no determination on the validity of any of the cessions. A determina-
tion that Virginia had been the sole owner of the territory would also have been a determi-
nation that the Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York claims were without merit. For
the Confederation to have made such a decision would have involved it in precisely the
type of disputes over limiting state charter rights that it wisely refused to consider. E.g., 17
JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 806 (1780) (refusing to consider the respective claims of right
of Maryland and Virginia "as they involve questions, a discussion of which was declined on
mature consideration, when the articles of confederation were debated.") See P. ONUF,
supra note 70, at 94-102. Second, if Congress recognized Virginia as the sole prior owner
of the land ceded, the subsequent acceptance of Connecticut's cession is puzzling because
that state reserved lands totaling some 6 million acres west of Pennsylvania. See 30JouR-
NALS, supra note 98, at 299-301, 307-08, 310-11 (1786); 31 id. at 654-55. Letter from Wil-
liam Grayson to James Madison (May 28, 1786), in 8 LETrERS OF MEMBERS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 372-75 (E. Burnett ed. 1936) [hereinafter cited as vol. CONFEDER-
ATION LETTERS]; Letter from James Monroe to Richard Lee (May 24, 1786), in id. at 365-
66; Letter from William Grayson to George Washington (May 27, 1786), in id. at 371-72.
108. 17 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 806 (the proposal of Sept. 6, 1780).
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pendence, as the other states."' 0 9 In conjunction with this language,
109. 18 id. at 915. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 47. The resolution of October 10,
1782, was a political solution to an unacceptable stalemate; it was achieved only after a
lengthy process of conciliation involving the colonial land companies as well as the landed
and landless states.
In June, 1778, Congress narrowly rejected a resolution to empower Congress to fix
the western boundaries of states claiming the "South Sea". 11 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at
631-32, 636-37 (1778). Maryland responded by declaring that it would ratify the Articles
only if they were amended, "giving full power to the United States in congress assembled
to ascertain and fix the western limits of the states claiming to extend to the Mississippi, or
South Sea." 10 W. HENING, supra note 93, at 549, 551 (Richmond 1822); 13 JOURNALS
supra note 98, at 29 (1779). Maryland's actions are subject to differing interpretations;
many leading Maryland politicians were financially interested in the land companies and
the state in many instances seemed more concerned with the potential speculative gain of
the companies than with the common benefit of the states. Compare H. ADAMS, MARY-
LAND's INFLUENCE UPON LAND CESSIONS TO THE UNITED STATES (1885) (arguing that Mary-
land's actions are traceable to altruistic motives) with T. ABERNETHY, supra note 95, at 169-
74, 230-46, 270-72; M.JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 150-56, 198-238 (1940);
Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 27 (1936);Jensen, The
Creation of the National Domain, 1781-1784, 26 id. 232 (1939) (arguing that Maryland's ac-
tions were traceable to the economic interests of its leading politicians). Some complex
mix of motives seems likely. See also Molovinski, supra note 82; Sioussat, The Chevalier de la
Luzerne and the Ratification of the Articles of Confederation by Maryland, 1780-81, 60 PA. MAG.
HIST. & Bio. 391 (1936).
Maryland's refusal meant that the thirteen states were unable to form a government;
Congress was simply a caucus of thirteen independent nations that lacked any dejure rela-
tionship, a fact many felt was hampering the war effort. E.g., Letter from James Duane to
George Washington (May 4, 1780), in 5 CONFEDERATION LETTERS, supra note 107, at 125;
M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 228. It was apparent that unanimity was
impossible without some compromise. The deadlock was broken in September and Octo-
ber, 1779, when Congress accepted the petitions of land companies whose claims had
been declared invalid by Virginia and referred them to a committee for consideration. 15
JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 1064-65, 1155, 1223-24, 1226-30 (1779). The North Carolina
delegates reported that for many members of Congress
the question respecting the justice or injustice of the claims of the [land] compa-
nies is not so much in View as that of laying down some principle or pursuing
such a line of conduct as may be most likely to obtain the main object, namely
that Congress shall have the disposal of all the unappropriated lands on the West-
ern frontiers of these States and that such lands may become the common prop-
erty of the whole.
Letter from the North Carolina Delegates to the Governor of North Carolina (Nov. 4,
1779), in 4 CONFEDERATION LETrERS, supra note 107, at 507. In December 1779, the Vir-
ginia's General Assembly issued a remonstrance, asserting that a congressional assump-
tion of jurisdiction would be "expressly contrary to the fundamental principles of the
confederation" and would create a precedent that could be used "to deprive of territory or
subvert the sovereignty" of any of the states. 10 W. HENING, supra note 93, at 557. In
February 1780, the New York legislature authorized its representatives to Congress to
cede its western claims, and shortly thereafter a committee was appointed to consider
Marvland's declaration, Virginia's remonstrance and New York's proffered cession. 17
JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 559-60 (1780). The committee reported that it was "unneces-
sary to examine into the merits or the policy" of the respective positions because such an
examination had been "declined on mature consideration, when the articles of confedera-
tion were debated [and could not now be] revived with any prospect of conciliation." Id. at
806. Instead, the committee recommended that Congress "press upon those states which
can remove the embarrassment respecting the western country, a liberal surrender of a
portion of their territorial claims, since they cannot be preserved entire without endanger-
ing the stability of the general confederacy." Id. The report was made on June 30, 1780,
id. at 580; it was read on July 3, id. at 586, and was approved without intervening formal
consideration on September 6. Id. at 806-07. With the adoption of the committee report,
Congress was fully committed to the nationalization of the western lands.
Immediately following approval, Jones and Madison of Virginia moved that any land
so ceded "shall be laid out in separate and distinct States at such time and in such manner
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
the classical theorists emphasize the language of the Virginia cession
that echoed it. The cession act provided that the territory ceded "shall
be laid out and formed into states . . . and the states so formed shall be
distinct republican states, and admitted members of the Federal Union,
having the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as
the other states."1 0 The classic theorists contend that the language of
these two documents forbids the retention of any lands because the ces-
sions were made and accepted on the promise that the ceded lands
would be "disposed of" by creating "distinct republican states [with]
the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the other
states." I I
The classic theorists' historical arguments thus rest upon the same
untenable assumptions as their equal footing analysis: the argument re-
solves into the contention that when the Confederation agreed that new
states carved from the ceded land were to have the "same rights of sov-
ereignty, freedom and independence, as the other states" they necessar-
ily meant that new states would either have title to or complete control
over all the vacant land within their borders. The classical theorists
again seek to equate "sovereignty" with "complete governmental au-
thority over land." 1
2
This interpretation is, however, undercut by other parts of the con-
gressional resolution. The ceded lands, the document states, "shall be
granted and settled at such times and under such regulations as shall
hereafter be agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled
... "l is Such an independent congressional determination is at least
anomalous if the resolution was intended to create a trust requiring
complete and immediate divestiture of federal control. This anomaly is
compounded by Congress's actions when it finally adopted regulations
for the settling of the ceded lands. The statute specifically provided for
as Congress shall hereafter direct"; the ceded land "shall be considered as a common fund
for the use and benefit" of the members of the Confederation and "therefore all purchases
and deeds [by the land companies] from. . . any Indian Nation ...shall be deemed and
taken as absolutely void." Id. at 808. On October 10, 1780, Congress adopted a resolu-
tion pursuant to the committee report and the subsequent motion by the Virginia dele-
gates. Id
110. Act ofJan. 2, 1781, 10 W. HENING, supra note 93, at 564, reprinted at 25JOURNALS,
supra note 98, at 560.
111. 18JouRNALS, supra note 98, at 915.
[I]t is of the essence of the writer's contention that [this resolution is] the basis
for only a trusteeship of territory by Congress for the exclusive purpose of state-
hood. . . and that it forbids the holding of territory by Congress within a state by
declaring that states created from such territory shall be admitted into the Union
on an equality with the original states in which at this time Congress did not own
one single foot of land.
Patterson, supra note 1, at 4748.
112. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text. Patterson, for example, takes the
most extreme position, stating that "it was intended that when a territorial government
was created it would be given the right to distribute the undeveloped lands within its bor-
ders just as the American colonies had done." Patterson, supra note 1, at 49. He cites no
authority for his statement and it is amply refuted by the wording of the very documents
upon which he relies. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
113. 18JouRNALS, supra note 98, at 915 (1780).
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retention of lands by the central government after the admission of a
state "to a share in the federal councils on an equal footing with the
original States" and prohibited any state interference with or taxation of
such federal lands. 1 4 Thus, Congress saw nothing inconsistent with re-
tention of land by the federal government and compliance with the com-
promise. Indeed, Congress adopted a far more restrictive and
imperialistic land policy than the states during the same period."
15
Again, the equation of state sovereignty with ownership or political con-
trol of land is untenable.
The participants' primary concern was not with specific uses for the
ceded lands; the language of the various resolutions, cessions, and ordi-
nances contain only general statements on the future uses of the ceded
lands. 1 16 Instead, the primary issue was determining who would make
the specific decisions. The compromise was the determination that the
decision would be made on a federal, instead of a state basis. Hence-
forth, the western lands would be held for the common good with no
particular state's citizens to be preferred. The essence of the compro-
mise was the specification of the decision maker, not the specification of
a decision. 17 There was general agreement that the ceded lands would
not be held in perpetual colonial status, but this decision could not be
114. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States north-
west of the river Ohio (July 13, 1787), reprinted at 1 Stat. 51 n.(a) (1789). The Ordinance
provides that "[tihe legislatures of those districts or new States, shall never interfere with
the primary disposal of the soil by the United States in Congress assembled, nor with any
regulations Congress may find necessary for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide
purchasers." Id. This provision was initially included in Resolutions for the Government
of the Western Territory (Apr. 23, 1784), in T. DONALDSON, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 148, 149
(1884). See B. HINSDALE, THE OLD NORTHWEST 247-69 (rev. ed. 1899); Berkhofer,Jefferson,
the Ordinance of 1784, and the Origins of the American Territorial System, 29 WM. & MARY Q. (3d.
Ser.) 231 (1972).
115. See Tatter, State and Federal Land Policy During the Confederation Period, 9 AGRIc. HIST.
176 (1935).
116. E.g., 30JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 654-55 (Connecticut deed of cession); 28 id. at
281 (Massachusetts deed of cession); 19 id. at 208-13 (New York deed of cession); 18 id. at
915 (Congressional resolution on disposition of ceded lands).
117. "[I]t was understood before adoption [of the Articles of Confederation] that the
tremendously important matter of the ownership of the back lands, and the administration
of the back settlements - in other words the extension of the empire - was to be in the
hands of Congress." McLaughlin, The Background of American Federalism, 12 AM. POL. Sci.
REv. 215, 239 (1918).
Furthermore, there is no indication in the debates surrounding the compromise or in
the terms of the compromise that the imperium/dominium dichotomy was considered a cru-
cial aspect of the dispute. The participants were aware of the distinction; the deeds of
cession, for example, conveyed all claims to "soil" and "jurisdiction." The New York leg-
islature authorized its representatives to limit the state's boundaries "either with respect to
the Jurisdiction as well as the Right. . .of Soil; or Reserving the Jurisdiction in part or in
whole over the Lands which may be ceded." 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS, supra note 107, at 4
(New York). See id. 7, 9 (Virginia's deed); id. II (Massachusetts' deed). The question sim-
ply attracted no particular attention. In part this is traceable to the fact that to have done
so would have required consideration of the nature of the interests actually conveyed by
the deeds and of the right of the various states to convey. Because the rights asserted by
the various states were inconsistent, such an examination was something that "by the acts
of Congress it appears to have been their intention ... to avoid all discussion of the
territorial rights of individual states, and only to recommend and accept a cession of their
claims, whatsoever they might be, to vacant territory." 25 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 563
(1783).
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made binding on the Congress. The specifics of the state-building pro-
cess and the relationship of the new states to the Union were spelled out
with even less clarity in the compromise. 118 These questions were nec-
essarily left for future resolution."19
C. Drafting the Constitution: Creating a More Energetic Government
It was against the background of the Confederation's compromise
and its evolving statutory thought on state-building that the delegates to
the Federal Convention met during the summer of 1787. The Conven-
tion was called in part because of the problems associated with the west-
ern lands: the Confederation Congress lacked the express power to hold
the public domain it owned as a result of the state cessions, to create
new states, or to admit those states into the Union. 120 Given these
118. The lack of agreement on the specific nature of the state-building process and of
the relationship of the new states to Congress is demonstrated by the changing require-
ments adopted in the various Confederation land ordinances. In the 1784 ordinance,
Congress was to mark off the boundaries of the new states that were to have immediate
self-government and were to be admitted into the Union when they had a population equal
to that of the least populous of the original states. 26 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 277-78
(1784). By 1786, Congress was considering a colonial government "similar to that which
prevail'd in these States previous to the revolution" followed by admission into the Union
when they achieved the previously specified population. Letter from James Monroe to
Thomas Jefferson (May 11, 1786), in 9JEFFERSON PAPERS, supra note 96, at 511. The Ordi-
nance of 1787 wound up somewhere between the earlier positions: appointed territorial
officials with a popular assembly. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (reen-
actment of Ordinance of 1787). For differing interpretations, compare M. JENSEN, THE
NEW NATION 352-59 (1950) (arguing that the ordinance of 1787 repealing that of 1784 was
an antidemocratic victory for the land speculators and their political supporters) with
Berkhofer, supra note 114 (the 1787 ordinance was the fruition of the 1784 ordinance
because both accepted the need for a preliminary period of central control).
119. There is an additional problem with the classical theorists' argument. Even as-
suming that their interpretation is correct and that the congressional resolution and the
state cessions created a legally binding (if somewhat nebulous) compact that the Confeder-
ation Congress was incapable of violating, the advocates of the classical doctrine face a
final hurdle: the Confederation Congress was replaced by the current constitutional gov-
ernment. Thus, unless the compromise retains constitutional stature, the advocates of the
classic doctrine are in the striking position of arguing that the compromise has a supra-
constitutional effect and remains valid despite the fact that it is the arguably unconstitu-
tional product of a defunct government.
Patterson attempts to circumvent this difficulty by arguing that "when the Congress
. . . readopted the Ordinance of 1787 in 1789, it pledged itself to the same [equal footing]
doctrine, thereby superseding the old Congress as the party to the compact." Patterson,
supra note 1, at 56. Congressional readoption of the ordinance, however, actually under-
cuts the classical argument. First, the first Congress concluded that it was necessary to
readopt the ordinance, that it did not survive the change in government. Second, because
the readoption was by simple statute, Congress is not bound by the terms of the Ordi-
nance if it decides to change policy. Finally, some classic theorists argue that the Confed-
eration Congress acted unconstitutionally in adopting the Ordinance of 1787. E.g., id. at
52 (quoting 3 E. CHANNING, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 546 (1912)). If the Confed-
eration's ordinances were illegal, it is difficult to see how the compromise retains continu-
ing vitality. Either the compromise amended the Articles of Confederation and thus
validated the Ordinance, or it did not and the entire process was unconstitutional. If the
latter, the statutory adoption of the Ordinance lacks constitutional stature and was re-
pealed at the latest by those provisions of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976 formally ending the policy of disposing of the fee in federal land. See Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(1), 1713 (1982)).
120. E.g., THE FEDERALIST, supra note 23, at No. 43, (J. Madison) at 290-91; id. No. 7, at
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shortcomings in the Confederation, the classic theorists' insistence on
continuity through the governmental change is surprising.
Despite the alleged constitutional stature of the classic doctrine, its
advocates devote remarkably little attention to the events of the Conven-
tion.' 2' For classic theorists, the lack of explicit statement authorizing
the federal government to hold property within states is conclusive: be-
cause both the colonies and the states under the Confederation had
been the exclusive landholding entities, the lack of specific constitu-
tional authorization to manage land - in conjunction with the terms of
the enclave clause of article I - means that Congress lacks the power to
do so.
12 2
As we have seen, this argument from silence is false. 123 The colo-
nies were not the exclusive landholding unit and the states ceded their
land claims to the Confederation in order to nationalize decision making
on the future of the ceded lands. In addition, the advocates' argument is
one of misdirection. The members of the Convention, like those of the
Confederation, were concerned with determining what institution would
make decisions regarding the territory acquired or to be acquired by the
federal government. Thus, the lack of explicit provisions for future uses
of the public domain reflects the fact that these questions were left for
subsequent political resolution. Article IV, section 3 simply reaffirmed
the Confederation's decision that the future of the public domain was a
national question rather than a state question.
The fact that the Convention chose largely to avoid specific deci-
sions regarding the disposition of the back lands does not mean that the
issues were of no concern. In fact, the Convention debated the issues
that had plagued the Confederation: ownership of the back lands and
the concomitant guarantees of the existing states' territorial integrity, 1
24
the political status to be accorded the western territory, and the condi-
tions under which the new states would be admitted into the Union.
36-39 (A. Hamilton); Brodie, supra note 1, at 696; Hardwicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note
1, at 422 n.74; Patterson, supra note 1, at 52, 53.
121. Brodie, supra note 1, at 724; Engdahl, supra note 1, at 288 n.10, 291 n.24; Hard-
wicke, Illig & Patterson, supra note 1, at 422-23; Patterson, supra note 1, at 57-60.
122. E.g., Patterson, supra note 1, at 57-59.
123. In most colonies, land was controlled by either the Crown or the proprietor rather
than a popularly elected body of colonists. See supra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, the central constitutional compromise of the Confederation involved a
transfer of control over the back lands from some of the states to the Confederation Con-
gress, a transfer intended to shift decision making from the state to the national level. See
supra notes 108-119 and accompanying text.
124. Although New York (1782), Virginia (1784), Massachusetts (1785), and Connecti-
cut (1786) had made cessions, Connecticut retained claims to the Western Reserve in what
is now northeastern Ohio, Massachusetts continued to control Maine, and Virginia re-
tained its claims south of the Ohio River. In addition, Georgia and the two Carolinas had
not made final cessions. These retained claims figured in the debates. For example, in the
debate on whether new states would be allowed equal representation with the existing
states, Morris of Pennsylvania expressed fears that North and South Carolina and Georgia
would soon be the majority because of their "great interior Country." I CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 23, at 605. Luther Martin, a delegate from Maryland, stressed the
same points in his subsequent Anti-Federalist pamphlet. L. MARTIN, GENUINE INFORMA-
TION (Baltimore, Md. 1787-88), reprinted in 3 id. at 172, 187, 189.
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These questions on the disposition of the western lands were also part
of a constellation of issues central to the Convention's compromise on
representation. The effect of the public domain on the precarious bal-
ance between North and South was a recurrent concern because most
delegates to the Convention assumed that the back lands would eventu-
ally become states. Although the general principle that Congress should
have the power to admit new states prompted little debate,1 2 5 the details
presented more difficulties because they were intertwined with the rep-
resentation issue and the more pervasive problems of sectionalism.
126
1. The Admission of New States: Equality or Congressional
Discretion?
One of the troublesome details was the question of whether new
states were to be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the
original states or whether Congress was to be given discretion in the
matter. Many delegates feared that if new states were admitted on the
basis of political equality they would soon come to dominate the na-
tional government; they, therefore, argued against proportional repre-
sentation and sought to prevent the new states from ever achieving a
majority in the proposed Congress. ! 27 Morris of Pennsylvania was the
125. Resolutions stating the general proposition were adopted unanimously every time
they were proposed. E.g., 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 23, at 117, 245; 2 id. at 39.
126. As Madison recognized:
[T]he States were divided into different interests not by their difference of size,
but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from cli-
mate, but principally from [the effects] of their having or not having slaves.
These two causes concurred in forming the great division of interest in the
U[nited] States. It did not lie between large and small States: it lay between the
Northern & Southern.
1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 23, at 486. Sectionalism was intrinsically intertwined
with the debate on the western lands because states formed from such lands would neces-
sarily affect the delicate balance that existed between Northern and Southern states.
The debate on proportional representation is exemplary. Although delegates from
other sections spoke in favor of proportional representation, the southern states were the
most vocal in support of such representation and thus the interests of the proposed new
states. The reasons for their support was succinctly stated by Mason of Virginia when he
noted that
the objection was that the Legislature would cease to be the Representatives of
the people. It would continue so no longer that the States now containing a ma-
jority of the people should retain that majority. As soon as the Southern & West-
ern population should predominate, which must happen in a few years, the power
w[oul]d be in the hands of the minority, and would never be yielded to the major-
ity, unless provided for by the Constitution.
Id. at 586. Morris of Pennsylvania acknowledged that this was the central issue, stating
that "the South[er]n Gentlemen will not be satisfied unless they see the way open to their
gaining a majority in the public Councils"; if they do so "and be joined as they will be with
the interior Country they will inevitably bring on a war with Spain for the Mississippi" to
the ruin of the commercial Northern states. Id. at 604. Butler of South Carolina acknowl-
edged that "[t]he people & strength of America are evidently bearing Southwardly &
S[outh] westw[ar]dly." Id. at 605. The Convention rejected the use of wealth as a measure
of representation. Id. at 606. See C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 593
(1928).
127. E.g., I CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 23, at 533-34 (Morris PA); id. at 534 (Rut-
ledge SC); id. at 559-60 (Gorham MA); id. at 571 (Morris PA); 2 id. at 2-3 (Gerry MA).
Despite an initial rejection, the issue returned in an altered from in a motion by Gerry
of Massachusetts to limit the number of western states so "that they should never be able
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most persistent opponent of equality for the new states, arguing that
[a]mong other objections it must be apparent [that the West]
would not be able to furnish men equally enlightened, to share
in the administration of our common interests. The Busy
haunts of men not the remote wilderness, was the proper
School of political Talents. If the Western people get the
power into their hands they will ruin the Atlantic interests. The
Back members are always most averse to the best measures. 
128
Others argued for the inclusion of wealth as a method of at least initially
limiting the power of the new states.'
29
In late August when the Committee on Detail presented its report,
the clause on admission of new states provided that they were to be ad-
mitted "on the same terms with the original States."' 30 When this pro-
vision came up for debate, Morris of Pennsylvania moved to strike the
requirement, not wishing "to bind down the Legislature to admit West-
ern States on the terms here stated [because he did not want] to throw
the power into their hands."' 131 Langdon of New Hampshire agreed,
arguing that "he did. not know but circumstances might arise which
would render it inconvenient to admit new States on terms of equal-
ity.' 1 32 Williamson of North Carolina "was for leaving the Legislature
free."' 3 3 Despite the argument of Madison and Mason of Virginia that
"the best policy is to treat them with that equality which will make them
friends not enemies,"' 134 Morris's motion was adopted by a nine-to-two
vote. 1
35
The convention thus specifically debated and rejected a constitu-
tional requirement that new states be admitted on an equal footing with
to outnumber the Atlantic States." 2 id. at 3. The motion was only narrowly defeated,
five-to-four with one state divided. Id.
128. 1 id. at 583. Madison of Virginia tartly responded that Morris apparently "deter-
mined human character by the points of the compass." Id. at 584. If so, Morris was not
alone. In his journal, Patterson of New Jersey noted that it was "[n]ecessary, that the
Atlantic States should take Care of themselves; the Western States will soon be very nu-
merous." Id. at 562. In fact, the view that the initial settlers on the frontier were at best
halfway between "tractable people" and "Indians" - in Jefferson's phrase - was com-
monly held. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 9, 1786), in 10 JEFFER-
SON PAPERS, supra note 96, at 112-13; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Dec. 16, 1786), id. at 603; Letter from the Virginia Delegates to the Governor of Virginia
(Nov. 1, 1783), 7 CONFEDERATION LETrERS, supra note 107, at 365 (settlers as "lawless
banditii and adventurers"); Letter from New York Delegates to the Governor of New York
(Sept. 19, 1783), id. at 300-01 (settlers as "lawless men"). See generally Berkhofer, The Re-
publican Origins oftheAmerican Territorial System, in THE WEST OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 152,
159-60 (1970) (arguing that republican legislators in Congress were in fundamental agree-
ment that frontiersmen were not immediately ready for complete political rights).
129. E.g., 1 CONVErcrTIoN RECORDS, supra note 23, at 446 (Williamson NC); id. at 542
(Butler SC); id. at 582 (Rutledge SC). Initially a majority favored allowing new states an
equal representation in Congress and the Convention rejected a proposal to include
wealth as one basis for representation. Id. at 534 (Mason VA); id. at 560 (Williamson NC);
id. at 584-85 (Madison VA); 2 id. at 3 (Sherman CT). The issue, however, was not dead.
130. 2 id. at 188.
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the existing states. Because the arguments of the classic theorists ulti-
mately distill into equal footing claims, it is perhaps not surprising that
they largely ignore the Convention's work.
2. The Admission of New States: Guaranteeing the Territory of
the Existing States
Another of the troublesome details that produced recurrent debate
was whether Congress would be granted the power to admit new states
within the territory of an existing state without that state's consent. One
of the original resolutions offered by Virginia Governor Randolph "pro-
vided that a Republican Government & the territory of each State . . .
ought to be guaranteed by the United States .... .136 The territorial
guarantee was removed when Read of New Jersey objected that "[t]he
guarantee will confirm the assumed rights of several states to lands
which do belong to the confederation."'
137
Given the remaining western claims of some states 13 8 and the
boundary disputes among others, 139 the issue was not so easily avoided.
It returned when the Convention took up the Committee of Detail's re-
port. The report provided that new states "may be admitted" upon ap-
proval of a two-thirds majority in Congress and the consent of the state
legislature if the new state "shall arise within the limits of any of the
present States .... ."140 Morris moved to amend the language so that
"no new State shall be erected within the limits of any present States,
without the consent of the Legislature of such State, as well as of the
Gen[era]l Legislature." 141 Martin of Maryland objected that the resolu-
tion guaranteed the boundaries of the landed states.
14 2
The tenuousness of the Confederation's compromise was evident in
136. 1 id. at 22. When the resolution came up for debate on June 5, it was deferred on
the motion of Patterson of New Jersey who wanted the representation question settled
first. Id. at 121.
137. Id. at 206. Following adoption of this resolution, the question of guaranteeing
territorial integrity became intertwined with the question of admitting new states. The
guarantee of a republican government became article IV, section 4 of the Constitution.
138. Virginia had ceded only its claims north of the Ohio River and thus retained what
became Kentucky. Georgia, North and South Carolina had not made any cessions of the
transmontane claims. Connecticut asserted a shadowy claim to lands west of Pennsylvania.
See B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 7-14 (1924).
139. The most troublesome dispute concerned Vermont, which was claimed by New
York. See 2 CONVENrION RECORDS, supra note 23, at 455 (Martin MD); id. at 463 (Morris
PA).
140. Id. at 188. The article originated in Governor Randolph's tenth resolution, which
hedged on the territorial guarantee issue by stating only that "provision ought to be made
for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether
from a voluntary junction of Government and Territory or otherwise." 1 id. at 22. It was
subsequently adopted without recorded debate. Id. at 121; 2 id. at 46. The ambiguous
phrase "lawfully arising within the limits of the United States" is clarified by a draft from
the Committee on Detail which defines the phrase as either "in the territory of the united
states, with the assent of the legislature [Congress]" or "within the limits of a particular
state, by the consent of a major part of the people of that state." Id. at 147. This defini-
tion was the basis of the Committee of Detail's report of August 6, which triggered the
debate on August 29th.
141. 2 id. at 455.
142. Id.
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the ensuing debate as both sides rehearsed well-worn arguments. Dele-
gates from the landless states of the mid-Atlantic urged "the unreasona-
bleness of forcing. . . the people of Virginia beyond the Mountains, the
Western people, of N[orth] Carolina & of Georgia, & the people of
Maine, to continue under the States now governing them, without the
consent of those States to their separation."' 4 3 Their opponents coun-
tered that "[w]hen the majority of a State wish to divide they can do so.
The aim of those in opposition to the article. . . was that the Gen[era]l
Government should abet the minority, & by that means divide a State
against its own consent."' 144 Williamson of North Carolina reminded
the delegates that "compulsion was not the policy of the U[nited]
S[tates]."' 14 5 The Maryland delegates' motions to strike the guarantee
and to give Congress the power to erect New States "within as well as
without the territory claimed by the several States" were both easily de-
feated.14 6 The Convention then approved Morris's resolution.1
4 7
Carroll of Maryland then sought at least to preserve his state's argu-
ment that the West was a common resource by adding a proviso that
"nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to affect the claim of the
U[nited] S[tates] to vacant lands ceded to them by the Treaty of peace."
He noted that this was to be understood as applying to "lands not
claimed by any particular State [as well as] some of the claims of particu-
lar States."'148 Wilson of Pennsylvania objected that there was nothing
in the Constitution affecting any claims and it was best to leave it that
way. 149 Madison of Virginia also thought it best to be silent on the sub-
ject, but suggested that "to make it neutral and fair, it ought to go far-
ther & declare that the claims of the particular States also should not be
affected."' 150 Carroll accepted this suggestion and amended his mo-
tion. 15 1 Morris of Pennsylvania then proposed a substitute:
143. Id. at 463 (Martin). Carroll of Maryland noting that "such was our situation with
regard to the Crown lands . . .that he perceived we should be at sea, if no guard was
provided for the right of the U[nited] States to the back lands" ominously suggested that
"all risks would be run by a considerable minority, sooner than give their concurrence" to
the proposed guarantee. Id. at 461-62. See also id. 456 (Dickenson) (arguing that it was
improper for the small states to guarantee the large states "their extensive claims of terri-
tory"). See generally L. MARTIN, supra note 124, at 223-27 (rehearsing Maryland's arguments
against extensive state land claims).
144. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 23, at 456 (Wilson). Rutledge of South Caro-
lina noted that the thrust of the proposal was that "the States are to be cut up without their
own consent." Id. at 462. Morris added that "[i]f the forced division of the the States is
the object of the new System" those states would soon leave the Union. Id. at 456. See alo
id. at 455 (Butler) (arguing that if a new state could be created without the approval of the
existing state that demagogues would seize upon fancied grievances to dismember the
states).
145. Id. at 462. He was careful to point out that his state was "well disposed to give up
her Western lands." Id.
146. Id. at 464.
147. Id. Dickinson of Delaware moved to add language covering the conjunction of




151. Id. at 465-66.
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The Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the U[nited] States; and nothing in this
constitution contained, shall be so construed as to prejudice
any claims either of the U[nited] S[tates] or of any particular
State. '
52
Morris' motion was adopted without informative debate and with only
Maryland in opposition.15 3 The Convention then turned to another
article.
The central dispute among the members of the Convention thus
mirrored the constitutional compromise of the Confederation. Again
there was a general agreement that Congress should have the discretion
to admit new states. The primary dispute centered on how states were
to be created and on their relationship to the new federal government.
Two specific issues in the dispute divided the Convention's delegates.
The first was whether the new Congress was to have unilateral authority
to admit states from lands within the claims of existing states, an issue
that echoed the ownership question of the Confederation's debates.
The landless states again sought to give the federal government this
power because they believed that the back lands had been gained "by
the blood and treasure of all, and ought therefore to be a common es-
tate to be granted out on terms beneficial to all the United States."'
154
The landed states, on the other hand, favored state consent when a new
state was to be formed from part of an old state. The landed states'
position was ultimately adopted: state consent was required.
The second divisive issue was whether to mandate admission of the
new states on terms of equality with the original states. The Convention
was split on this issue between those who feared the West - because its
inhabitants were not refined, because its emerging economy would draw
away capital and population, or because ultimately it would change the
precarious balance among the existing states - and those who viewed
the West as the future, a perspective that eventually seized the imagina-
tion of the country. Although the members of the Convention were un-
able to bridge their divergent perceptions, they did agree that the
decision was a political question for the new Congress and refused to
impose a constitutional equal footing requirement.
152. Id. Martin proposed adding a provision stating that such claims were to be de-
cided by the Supreme Court. Id. Morris argued that this was unnecessary since the
Supreme Court was to decide all cases in which the federal government was a party. Id.
Martin's motion was defeated.
153. Id. It has been suggested that possible sources of this language were two propos-
als made by Madison. C. WARREN, supra note 126, at 599-600. On August 18, he had
presented a list of nine additional powers that he felt the Congress should be granted.
Among these were the power "[to dispose of the unappropriated lands of the U[nited]
States [and] [t]o institute temporary Governments for New States arising therein." 2 CoN-
VENTION RECORDS, supra note 23, at 324. This list along with another offered by Pinkney of
South Carolina was referred to the Committee of Detail. Id. at 325. The provisions were
never formally reported from the Committee.
154. Declaration of the Maryland General Assembly (Dec. 15, 1778), reprinted in 10 W.
HENING, supra note 93, at 540, 541.
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Having determined that state boundaries would be guaranteed and
that Congress would have discretion to both admit new states and set
the terms of their admission, Morris proposed the "Territory or other
Property" clause to complete the necessary congressional authority:
that Congress be given the power to dispose of the public domain and to
make those rules and regulations it deemed necessary to govern and
manage the lands. In light of the broad discretion that the Convention
chose to vest in Congress over the entire state-building process, the
classic theorists' argument that the Convention denied Congress any
discretion as to the future uses of the public domain is nonsensical.
Because of his role in the adoption of the language of article IV,
section 3,155 Morris' subsequent interpretation of its meaning is inform-
ative. In response to a question on whether Congress could admit a
state formed from territory not belonging to the United States at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, Morris wrote:
I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and
Louisiana it would be proper to govern them as provinces, and
allow them no voice in our councils. In wording the third sec-
tion of the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would
permit to establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add
my belief, that, had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong
opposition would have been made.
156
Those who would argue that the language of the property clause neces-
sitates divestiture of federal title or state control over federal lands
within a state must thus contend with the fact that its author believed
that it carried the opposite meaning. The point is not that Morris's con-
struction is required, but that the language is capable of supporting a
range of interpretations: the constitutional text is almost as uncertain as
the text of the Confederation's compromise.
The debates in the Federal Convention reiterated the debates of the
Confederation Congress and the solution that the convention reached
echoed the compromise that the Confederation Congress had achieved.
The central government was to be the recipient of voluntary state ces-
sions; compulsion was not to be used. As in other areas where it was
unable to resolve strongly held opposing views, 15 7 the Convention
155. The final language in article IV, section 3 came almost exclusively from Morris. It
was his language with the addition of the phrase from Dickinson that became the first
clause providing for the admission of new states only with the approval of Congress and an
existing state or states if the land was within one of more states. Morris also provided the
"Territory or other Property" language of the second clause. Only the savings provision
which ends the second clause, which was provided by Carroll and Madison, is not Morris's.
See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
156. Letter from Gouveneur Morris to Henry Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), 3 CONVENTION
RECORDS, supra note 23, at 404. But see generally Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) (arguing that the Farmers intended the Constitution to
be interpreted in terms of objective rather than individualistic intent).
157. The classic example of this process was the decision to grant Congress the power
to determine whether to create "inferior tribunals." A majority of the states were unwill-
ing to create such tribunals within the body of the Constitution, but were willing to author-
ize Congress to make the decision. I CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 23, at 104-05, 119,
124-25; 2 id. at 45-46. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
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passed the dispute along to the Congress it was creating. Thus, it did
not impose a constitutional equal footing requirement, nor specify the
uses to be made of the back lands. The delegates chose instead to de-
cide who would decide.
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the arguments of the advocates of the "classic"
property clause doctrine on each point are unpersuasive. They fail to
provide a textual analysis to support their contention that the operative
terms in the article IV property clause must be given different effect
when used in other parts of the document. Furthermore, they offer no
justification for their presumption that land is necessarily different than
other subjects of federal preemptive authority. Their analysis of the
case law is equally unpersuasive: a straining of dicta that relies upon a
never-accepted equation of state sovereignty with state control. The
history they offer is mythology.
These problems result from the fact that the classic theorists' prop-
osition is inconsistent with the very structure of the Constitution. 1
58
The Constitution is foremost a grant of powers to the federal govern-
ment, allocating the authority to decide. As Chief Justice John Marshall
noted, because these are grants from all of the people, it is illogical to
assume that people residing in one state have the authority to frustrate
the decisions of all the people: "They did not design to make their gov-
ernment dependent upon the States."' 15 9 Just as the power to tax fed-
eral instrumentalities is necessarily inconsistent with structure of the
Constitution, so is the power to regulate the uses of federal land. The
determination of the Constitutional Convention that decisions on the
use of the back lands were to be national decisions, not state decisions,
means precisely that a state may not control or frustrate those decisions.
The inconsistency between the classic theorists' proposition and the
structure of the Constitution is ultimately the fatal flaw in their theory.
It seeks to redefine the very structure of the government, to resuscitate a
position rejected at the very outset of the current constitutional govern-
ment. The argument that the language granting the power "to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
or other Property [of] the United States" 160 restricts instead of expands
federal authority is inconsistent with the basic structure of the federal
government as an institution and with its relationship with the states.
Thus, it is hardly surprising that since the earliest days of this govern-
WECHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 11-12 (1973); C. McGOWAN,
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 18-20 (1969).
158. See generally C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1969) (the very structure of the document necessarily implies certain federal
relationships).
159. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432 (1819). See id. at 404-06,
431-32.
160. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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ment the Supreme Court has consistently held that the federal power
over article IV lands "is vested in Congress without limitation."'1' 1
161. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537 (1840). See also Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 526 U.S. 529, 539 (1976); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27 (1947);
United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940); Light v. United States, 220 U.S.
523, 537 (1911) (quoting the same language).
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